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AN AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT 
AND AN AFRICAN UNION COURT: A 
NEEDFUL DUALITY OR A NEEDLESS 
DUPLICATION?  
Nsongurua J. Udombana∗ 
“Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, the international community has witnessed 
an avalanche of international dispute settlement mecha-
nisms, which Cesare Romano referred to as “the international 
judiciary.”2  It is the consequence of a “tumultuous amplification 
of the number and ambit of institutions consecrated to ensure 
compliance with international legal obligations and settlement 
of disputes arising therefrom.”3  Some of these mechanisms are 
permanent in nature while others are ad hoc; some exercise full 
judicial powers, while others are quasi-judicial and administra-
tive.4  This state of affairs would have been inconceivable fifty 
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 1. “Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”  Cesare P.R. 
Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the 
Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999) (quoting William of Ockham). 
 2. Id. at 711 n.7 (defining the phrase to mean “those judicial bodies that 
have been created to administer international justice, without implying the 
existence of any degree of coordination among them”). 
 3. Id. at 710.  Romano also argues that the “‘international judicial law 
and organization’ can and should be studied as a discipline in its own right, 
without the need to be subsumed under the general category of ‘Peaceful Set-
tlement of International Disputes.’”  Id. at 711. 
 4. For the criteria characterizing an international court, tribunal or body, 
see generally, Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals with 
Regionally Restricted and/or Specialized Jurisdiction, in JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
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or so years ago — because at that time the “main concern of in-
ternational law was to convince states of the attractiveness and 
usefulness of third-party dispute settlement.”5 Although inter-
national arbitration had been in existence — long before mod-
ern international courts — very few judicial institutions with 
universal jurisdiction existed at the international level in the 
1950s and 60s.  Among these were the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”), the European Court of Justice, and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.  In the 70s, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights was established.   
Today, however, the landscape has changed, with new judi-
cial institutions springing up throughout the world.  These new 
institutions include the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Dispute Set-
tlement System, and, most recently, the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”).  Earlier institutions have also been strengthened 
and, in some cases, restructured or reformed for optimal per-
formance. 
At the first glance, the proliferation of international tribunals 
seems to give a reason for cheer, because it indicates the suc-
cess of peaceful settlement of international disputes — a devel-
opment that the Charter of the United Nations (“UN”) particu-
larly encourages.6  Peaceful settlement of international disputes 
  
OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 285 (1974).  According to Tomuschat, an interna-
tional body must meet five criteria. First, it must be permanent, which is to 
say that its existence must be independent from the vicissitudes of a given 
case. Second, an international legal instrument must have established it. 
Third, in deciding the cases submitted to them, they must resort to interna-
tional law. Fourth, they must decide those cases on the basis of rules of proce-
dure that pre-exist the case and usually cannot be modified by the parties. 
Lastly, the outcome of the process must be legally binding.  Id. at 293–312. 
 5. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts and Tri-
bunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction — Problems and Possible Solutions, in 5 
MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 67, 69 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rudi-
ger Wolfrum eds., 2001).  See also generally Hermann Mosler et al., Chapter 
XIV: The International Court of Justice, in The CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 973 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (for the efforts within 
the framework of the United Nations (“UN”) towards the pacific settlement of 
international disputes). 
 6. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, paras. 3–4, 33.  The ICJ has confirmed that 
Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter is a rule of customary law applying 
to all states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
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by judicial recourse helps parties to clarify their positions.  Of-
ten, they are led “to reduce and transform their sometimes 
overstated political assertions into factual and legal claims.”7  
The judicial route also moderate tensions and lead to a better 
and fuller understanding of opposing claims and, in some cases, 
the resumption of political negotiations even before a court ren-
ders judgment.8  Surprisingly, however, the multiplication of 
international tribunals has generated heated debates in recent 
years.9  Some scholars have expressed the fear that the prolif-
eration of tribunals will result in “the fragmentation of the in-
ternational legal system or, at least, [in] the fragmentation of 
the interpretation of its norms.”10  Such proliferation also raises 
the risk of “forum shopping” — the practice of parties competing 
for courts — with the overlapping of jurisdictions that could 
jeopardize both the unity of international law and its role in 
inter-State relations across the world. 
Others, however, believe that there is no cause for alarm and 
that wine can vary with every valley and every vineyard.  In-
deed, proponents of multiplicity adduce many reasons to justify 
their belief that the variety of third-party dispute settlement 
  
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”  See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, at 99-101 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. 
 7. Address by the Honorable Stephen M. Schwebel, Judge to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, President of the International Court of Jus-
tice (Oct. 27, 1998), available at http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/ 
cijwww/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeechPresidentGA98.htm [hereinaf-
ter Schwebel Address]. 
 8. See id. 
 9. For the debate, see generally Implications of the Proliferation of Inter-
national Adjudicatory Bodies for Dispute Resolution: Proceedings of a Forum 
Co-Sponsored by the American Society of International Law and the Graduate 
Institute of Int’l Studies, 9 ASIL BULLETIN (L. Boisson de Chazournes ed., Nov. 
1995); Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, 44 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 848 (1995); Gerhard Hafner, Should One Fear the Prolif-
eration of Mechanisms for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes?, in THE 
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES: UNIVERSAL AND 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 25 (Lucius Caflisch ed., 1998). 
 10. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of 
the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 792 (1999).  
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vehicles for states is generally desirable.11  The justifications 
include the desire by states and non-state actors for “secrecy, 
control over the membership of the forum, panels with special 
expertise or perceived regional sensitivities, preclusion of third 
state intervention, and forums that can resolve disputes in 
which non-state entities may appear as parties.”12  According to 
proponents, the strength of the multiplicity of international tri-
bunals has the benefit of permitting “a degree of experimenta-
tion and exploration, which can lead to improvements in inter-
national law.”13  Multiplicity of international tribunals also re-
flects the vitality and complexity of international life and, 
therefore, should be welcomed — so long as their jurisdictions 
do not duplicate each other. Ultimately, such tribunals will con-
tribute significantly to the peaceful and just settlement of in-
ternational disputes.14 
Recent events in Africa tend to show that African leaders 
have been greatly impressed by the proliferation of courts and 
tribunals.  They are preparing to set up two supra-national ju-
dicial institutions for the continent, in addition to several other 
sub-regional judicial institutions that have sprung up in recent 
years.  These sub-regional tribunals include a court set up to 
interpret the Treaty Establishing the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (“SADC”)15 and the Community Court of 
  
 11. See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Organs and the Formation of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE HAGUE’S 750TH ANNIVERSARY 433 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1999) (taking an 
optimistic view on international organs and international law).  See also Jona-
than I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth 
of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 698 
(1999) [hereinafter Charney, Impact of International Courts] (focusing on the 
relationship between the International Court of Justice and other permanent 
and ad hoc tribunals that have shared the responsibility of hearing cases 
turning on aspects of international law).  See also Jonathan Charney, Is In-
ternational Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEL 
DES COURS 101 (1998). 
 12. Charney, Impact of International Courts, supra note 11, at 698. 
 13. Id. at 700. 
 14. See Schwebel Address, supra note 7. 
 15. Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, 
Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116 (1993) [hereinafter SADC Treaty]. 
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Justice established pursuant to a protocol16 adopted by member 
states of the Economic Community of West African States 
(“ECOWAS”).17 On June 9, 1998, at its Thirty-fourth Ordinary 
Session held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the now-defunct Organiza-
tion of African Unity18 (“OAU”) adopted a Protocol (“Human 
Rights Protocol” or “Protocol”)19 to the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”)20 on the Establish-
ment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Afri-
can Human Rights Court” or “Human Rights Court”).  This Pro-
tocol establishes a Human Rights Court to complement the pro-
tective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peo-
  
 16. For the Protocol Establishing the Community Court of Justice, see 
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, arts. 18–20, 30 I.L.M. 
1241 (1991).   
 17. See Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), May 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1200 (1975) (original ECOWAS Treaty, 
superceded by 1993 treaty); Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS): Revised Treaty, July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996) [hereinafter 
Revised ECOWAS Treaty] (striving to accelerate the economic union of West 
Africa through effective economic cooperation and integration). 
 18. The OAU ceased to function as a continental international organization 
on July 9, 2002, when the African Union (see infra) was inaugurated in Dur-
ban, South Africa. The occasion witnessed, simultaneously, the last (thirty-
eighth) ordinary session of the OAU and the first ordinary session of the Afri-
can Union. 
 19. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU 
Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III), available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/ 
for-relations/multilateral/treaties/court.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Pro-
tocol]. 
 20. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter 
African Charter].  For literature, see generally, U. O. UMOZURIKE, The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 902 (1997); Makau 
Mutau, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective, 3 
REV. AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS. 5 (1993); Obinna Okere, The Pro-
tection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American 
Systems, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 141 (1984); U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 902 (1983); and Richard Git-
tleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis, 
22 VA. J. INT’L L. 667 (1982). 
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ples’ Rights21 and defines the organization, jurisdiction, and 
functioning of the Court.22 
In addition, on July 11, 2000, at its Thirty-sixth Ordinary 
Session held in Lome, Togo, the OAU adopted the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (“AU”)23  to replace the Charter of the 
[OAU]24 and to strengthen the African Economic Community 
(“AEC”) Treaty.25  The Act, which entered into force on May 26, 
2001, provides for an African Court of Justice (“AU Court”) 
among several other organs of the Union.26  Unlike the Protocol 
to the African Charter, the AU Act does not define the composi-
tion, mandate, and functioning of the AU Court.  It merely pro-
  
 21. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 2 (providing that “[t]he 
Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the 
protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
. . . conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”). 
 22. For commentary on the Protocol, see generally Nsongurua J. Udom-
bana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late 
Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45 (2000) [hereinafter Udombana, 
Better Late Than Never]; Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Rein-
forcing the African System of Human Rights: The Protocol on the Establish-
ment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HUM. 
RTS. 431 (1998) (analyzing the Protocol’s provisions and drawing comparisons 
with other regional human rights judicial organs); Andre Stimmet, Comment, 
A Future African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Domestic Human 
Rights Norms, 23 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 233 (1998); John Mubangizi & Adreas 
O’Shea, An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 24 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 256 (1999); Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights Court: A Two-
Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342 (1999). 
 23. See CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION, July 11, 2002, at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/treaties/auact.htm [hereinaf-
ter AU ACT]. 
 24. Id. art. 33(1) (stating that the OAU Charter would remain operational 
for a transitional period). 
 25. See Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 (entered into force May 11, 1994) [hereinafter AEC 
Treaty] (providing for the establishment of an African Economic Community, 
through a gradual process that would be achieved by coordination, harmoniza-
tion and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future re-
gional economic communities). 
 26. See AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 5(1) (listing nine organs of the AU, 
including the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Pan-African 
Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Represen-
tatives Council, the Specialised Technical Committees, the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council, and the Financial Institutions).  The Act, however, 
gives the Assembly the power to establish any other organ of the Union.  Id. 
art. 5(2). 
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vides that those matters shall be dealt with in a separate, fu-
ture protocol,27 which has yet to be adopted. 
This Article examines the developments of African interna-
tional judicial institutions and discusses whether the proposal 
for two continental courts is a necessary duality or a needless 
duplication.  Can the AU sustain all the institutions it has cre-
ated, including the courts, or is it trying to run before walking?  
Put differently, is it really impracticable for a single court to 
interpret and apply all the relevant instruments adopted by the 
OAU/AU, including the African Charter and the AU Act?  Did 
the continent’s leaders think through the implications of two 
courts, or were they simply fascinated and carried away by the 
European experiences?  The author disagrees with the current 
approach taken by the AU leaders and insists that no new in-
ternational court should be created without first ascertaining if 
the existing institutions could better perform their duties.  
Part II provides the background by looking at the history of 
international dispute settlements in Africa in a global compara-
tive context.  Part III highlights the normative structure of the 
proposed African Human Rights Court and the African Union 
Court (AU Court) by analyzing the enabling protocol and re-
lated instruments.  Part IV examines the arguments for and 
against having both courts in light of African realities and pecu-
liarities.  The European experience will be brought to bear in 
the debate.  Part V concludes by recapitulating the discourse 
and providing some feasible recommendations.  
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS IN A COLLECTIVE AFRICA IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT 
A. Attempts, Not Deeds 
The creation of permanent international courts for dispute 
settlement in a collective Africa is a novelty.  It is largely a de-
velopment of the last decade of the twentieth century.  Indeed, 
the first time in AU history that a reference was made to a 
“court” as a mechanism for dispute settlement in Africa was in 
  
 27. Id. art. 18. 
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relation to the 1991 AEC Treaty.28  Traditionally, African lead-
ers have always favored the use of quasi-judicial commissions 
(two such commissions will be briefly noted below), rather than 
a court with full judicial powers.  The reason for this anti-court 
approach stems partly from the nature of African customary 
law29 and long-time dispute settlement practice. Traditional Af-
rican dispute settlement places a premium on improving rela-
tions between the parties on the basis of equity, good con-
science, and fair play, rather than on strict legality.  The Afri-
can system “is one of forgiveness, conciliation and open truth, 
not legal friction or technicality.”30  African procedures favor 
consensus and amicable dispute settlement, frowning upon the 
adversarial and adjudicative procedures common to Western 
legal systems.31 
Another reason for the delayed emergence of courts in a col-
lective Africa is that the emerging African states were reluctant 
to relinquish their hard won independence and sovereignty to 
any form of supra-national entity.  This reluctance also ex-
plained why the OAU Charter stresses full respect for state 
sovereignty.32  The OAU was in fact born “in a context of nearly 
  
 28. See AEC Treaty, supra note 25, arts. 7, 18; Chris M. Peter, The Pro-
posed African Court of Justice — Jurisprudential, Procedural, Enforcement 
Problems and Beyond, 1 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 117, 118 (1993). 
 29. African customary law has been distinguished from African customary 
practices, beliefs or value systems. The former represents a generic system of 
rigid rules “embedded in judicial decisions and statutes, which have lost the 
characteristics of dynamism and adaptability which distinguished African 
custom.”  Thandabantu Nhlapo, Indigenous Law and Gender in South Africa: 
Taking Human Rights and Cultural Diversity Seriously, 1994–1995 THIRD 
WORLD LEGAL STUD. 49, 53.  African customary practices, beliefs, or value 
systems are more susceptible to change and are thus more receptive to insti-
tutions which have the promise of fostering societal development.  See Laur-
ence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in Kenya: 
Making a Case for Institutional Reformation and Revitalization of Customary 
Adjudication Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 459, 462–65 (2002) (assessing 
the relevance of African Customary Law in a plural legal system seeking to 
uphold human rights principles). 
 30. A. L. Ciroma, Time for Soul-Searching, DAILY TIMES (Nig.), Aug. 23, 
1979, at 3. 
 31. See Udombana, Better Late Than Never, supra note 22, at 74.  See also 
generally TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 
(1962). 
 32. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. 
III(2), 479 U.N.T.S. 69, 74 [hereinafter OAU Charter]. 
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untrammeled state sovereignty, in which heads of states sought 
sedulously to safeguard the independence so recently won.”33  
This sovereignty principle, together with the non-interference 
principle — the reserve domain — became the identity symbol 
of the organization. The organization, thus, became a personal-
ity club in perpetual mutual adoration. 
The reluctance towards modern judicial settlement was mani-
fested at the founding conference of the OAU in 1963.  The OAU 
rejected the draft Charter provision that provided for a Court of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to be set up by means 
of a separate treaty.34  Instead, African leaders created an ad 
hoc body, the “Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbi-
tration,” as a mechanism for the peaceful dispute settlement35 
among Member States to accomplish the purposes of the Char-
ter.36   The Commission was described as the raison d’etre of the 
OAU, given that the “peaceful resolution of conflicts, both large 
and small, within the established framework of the Organiza-
tion provides the necessary conditions for orderly progress, not 
only for the individual Member States but also the entire conti-
nent of Africa.”37  A protocol adopted in 1964 defined the duties 
and powers of the Commission.38   Pursuant to the article 32, 
this protocol became an integral part of the OAU Charter.39  
  
 33. Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human Rights and 
Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43 (1992) 
(discussing the birth of the OAU and noting that the founders did not focus on 
human rights policy in the original OAU Charter). 
 34. See ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: 
IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS ¶ 21, at 8 (OAU Information Services Publication, 
No. 2, 1993). 
 35. “Disputes” in this context refer not only to justifiable disputes, i.e., 
matters that raise legal questions and that can be settled by the application of 
international law, but also to political issues or other extra-legal considera-
tions.  See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 
P.I.C.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11–12 (Aug. 30); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 
I.C.J. 90, ¶¶ 20–22, at 99–100 (June 30). 
 36. See OAU Charter, supra note 32, arts. xix, VII(4). 
 37. See Dr. Taslim Olawale Elias, The Commission of Mediation, Concilia-
tion and Arbitration of the Organisation of African Unity, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 336, 348 (1964).  See also Colin Legum, The Specialised Commissions of the 
Organisation of African Unity, 2 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 587 (1964). 
 38. See Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion, 3 I.L.M. 1116 (1964). 
 39. There was no provision for a formal adoption of the Protocol.  Article 32 
of the Protocol merely required the approval of the OAU Assembly for it to 
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The Commission was not a judicial body, but it provided three 
modes of settlement: mediation, conciliation and arbitration.  
This Commission, however, never became operational.  Techni-
cally, it continued to exist, since its formal abolition required an 
amendment to the OAU Charter, which was not done.  The 
OAU Secretary-General was, however, mandated to dispense 
with all the assets of the Commission, and it was subsequently 
dissolved.40 
Another opportunity to establish a judicial institution for the 
settlement of international disputes in Africa beckoned during 
the adoption of the African Charter in the early 1980s.  How-
ever, the OAU refused to establish an African Human Rights 
Court to enforce the rights guaranteed in the African Charter, 
the same way as it treated the proposal for a Court of Mediation 
in the 1960s.  African leaders disregarded the recommendations 
of the 1961 Lagos Conference41 and the repeated proposals and 
recommendations over the following twenty years, fearing that 
such a tribunal would threaten their national sovereignty.  The 
OAU instead established an African Human Rights Commis-
sion.  This Commission was established in 1987, pursuant to 
article 64(1) of the African Charter42 “to promote human and 
peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa.”43  It pres-
ently remains the only quasi-judicial body at the continental 
  
become an integral part of the OAU Charter; and this approval was given in 
at the first Assembly in July 1964. 
 40. See Council of Ministers, Res. CM/Res.240 (XVI) (on file with author).  
 41. In 1961, the International Commission of Jurists (“Int’l. C.J”) convened 
scholars from thirty-three countries to discuss enforcement mechanisms for 
the protection of human rights in the newly independent states of Africa. At 
the end of the Conference, participants adopted the “Law of Lagos,” calling for 
the establishment of African Convention on human rights and a court to en-
force it.  Article 4 declared that “in order to give full effect to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, this Conference invites the African 
Governments to study the possibility of adopting an African Convention of 
Human Rights in such a manner that the Conclusions of this Conference will 
be safeguarded by the creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that 
recourse thereto be made available for all persons under the jurisdiction of the 
signatory States.”  Editorial, From Delhi to Lagos, 3 J. INT’L COMM. JURISTS 2, 
9 (1961). 
 42. See African Charter, supra note 20, art. 64(1) (“After the coming into 
force of the present Charter, members of the Commission shall be elected in 
accordance with the relevant Articles of the present Charter.”). 
 43. Id. art. 30. 
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level to implement the rights guaranteed in the African Char-
ter, but no more than those rights.  The Commissions’ activities 
include consideration of communications, examination of State 
reports, on-site missions, inter-session activities of the Commis-
sioners, reports of Special Rapporteurs, conferences, and semi-
nars, etc.44  More specifically, the Commission receives commu-
nications from states45 or “other communications”46 from indi-
viduals or Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO”s),47 which 
allege any violation of the Charter provisions.  Such communi-
cations must, however, satisfy certain “conditions laid down by 
the . . . Charter.”48 
The African Commission has not been able to effectively ful-
fill its mandate because of certain normative and structural 
deficiencies.49  Its decisions and recommendations to African 
Heads of States and Governments are frequently disregarded.  
As a report of the African Commission pointed out, “[w]ith the 
sovereignty of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
and the Charter’s non-provision of alternative methods of com-
pensation for victims of Human Rights violations, the said vic-
  
 44. See id. art. 45.  See generally Dr. RACHEL MURRAY, THE AFRICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); 
EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS (1996); Emmanuel Bello, The Mandate of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Article 45 Mandate of the Commission, 1 AFR. J. 
INT’L L. 31 (1988). 
 45. See African Charter, supra note 20, arts. 47–49. 
 46. Id. art. 55. 
 47. Only NGOs with observer status with the Commission have the compe-
tence to institute proceedings before it.  Any “serious” NGO desiring to have 
an observer status with the Commission must submit a documented applica-
tion to the Secretariat of the Commission showing its willingness and capabil-
ity to work for the realization of the objectives of the African Charter.  It must 
also provide its status, proof of its legal existence, a list of its members, its last 
financial statement and a statement of its activities.  The Commission there-
after designated a rapporteur to study the application and, if all necessary 
documents have been received, the Commission considers the application dur-
ing any of its sessions, usually in October and May each year.  See Resolution 
on the Criteria for Granting and Enjoying Observer Status to Non-
Governmental Organizations Working in the Field of Human Rights with the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & 
Peoples’ Rts., 25th Ord. Sess., OAU Doc. DOC/OS(XXVI)116 (1999). 
 48. African Charter, supra note 20, art. 45(2). 
 49. See Udombana, Better Late Than Never, supra note 22, at 66–73 (dis-
cussing the structural and normative deficiencies bedeviling the Commission). 
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tims find themselves without any remedy.”50 Such non-
compliance constitutes “one of the major factors of the erosion of 
the Commission’s credibility,”51 because it undermines the au-
thority of the Commission as an effective institution capable of 
ensuring the states’ implementation of the rights secured in the 
African Charter. 
B. Global Contrasts 
The late arrival of permanent supra-national courts in Africa 
contrasts with other established global and regional tribunals.  
This part briefly examines the development at the global level.  
The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the 
“World Court,” for example, was established under the League 
of Nations after World War I and began to function in 1922.  Its 
creation was regarded as a decisive path towards the submis-
sion of a sovereign state’s activity to the international rule of 
law.52  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)53 succeeded the 
PCIJ after World War II as “substantially a continuation of the 
earlier body.”54  It remains the only international court of a uni-
versal character with general jurisdiction.55  It serves “as a fac-
  
 50. African Commission, Non-Compliance of State Parties to Adopted Rec-
ommendations of the African Commission: A Legal Approach, ¶ 6, adopted at 
the 24th Ord. Sess. of the Commission Banjul, The Gambia, Oct. 1998, OAU 
DOC/OS/50b (XXIV). 
 51. Id. ¶ 2. 
 52. Dupuy, supra note 10, at 791.  See generally SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933). 
 53. Established pursuant to the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  
See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT (1997). 
 54. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 548 (1998). 
 55. The ICJ is fitted both with contentious jurisdiction and advisory juris-
diction. For its contentious jurisdiction, however, States Parties must recog-
nize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, 
art. 36(2) (“The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, 
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of 
the Court in all legal disputes . . . .”) (emphasis added).  Where, for example, 
both states have limited the jurisdiction that they will recognize, the ICJ only 
has power to decide a case to the extent that both states have agreed to the 
same sort of matters. Cf. Eastern Carelia (Fin. v. U.S.S.R.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
B) No. 5, at 27 (July 23) (“It is well established in international law that no 
State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other 
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tor and actor in the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity.”56  That way, the ICJ assists in furthering one of the 
purposes of the UN, to wit, “to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and interna-
tional law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes 
which might lead to a breach of the peace.”57  As of July 2001, 
189 States acceded to the ICJ Statute, out of which 63 have rec-
ognized its compulsory jurisdiction.58  
The ICJ has operated concurrently with other ad hoc tribu-
nals, such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals59 and the international criminal tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia60 and Rwanda.61  In recent years, however, 
  
States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific 
settlement.”). 
 56. See Schwebel Address, supra note 7. 
 57. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. 
 58. See 2000–2001 I.C.J. ANN. REP. pt. I, at 1, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/igeninf_Annual_Reports/iICJ_Annual_Rep
ort_2000-2001.PDF [hereinafter 2000–2001 I.C.J. ANN. REP.] (containing the 
2001 Annual Report of activities of the ICJ to the General Assembly of the 
UN). 
 59. These two tribunals were established “for the trial of war criminals 
whose offences have no particular geographical location whether they be ac-
cused individually or in their capacity as members of organizations or groups 
or in both capacities.”  Agreement Respecting the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 1, 
59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
 60. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
sitting at the Hague, was established in 1993, pursuant to a Statute of that 
name.  See Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 
(1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/lateestleft-e.htm.  It is an 
ad hoc tribunal, with a mandate to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.  Its 
Statute defines its jurisdiction and powers.  Its ratione materiae is limited to 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, id. art. 2; viola-
tions of the laws or customs of war, id. art. 3; genocide, id. art. 4; and crimes 
against humanity, id. art. 5.  See also MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 277 (Philip Sands ed., 1999) [hereinafter MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS]; Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.INT’L L. 
57 (1999). 
 61. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was estab-
lished in 1994 by a UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the 
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the rate of change from ad hoc to permanent tribunals and 
courts has increased dramatically.  The International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”), created in Rome on July 17, 1998, is the latest 
addition.62  The ICC is a landmark in international judicial co-
operation and possibly the greatest step towards a multilateral 
justice system since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.  As 
the direct descendant of these tribunals and the more recent 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC will 
prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,63 
when national justice systems are either unwilling or unable to 
do so.  
  
UN Charter.  See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
U.N. SCOR 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), as amended by SC Res. 
1165.  It has as its mandate the prosecution of persons responsible for geno-
cide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 
in the course of or in relation to the 1994 Rwanda Genocide.  In many re-
spects, the ICTR was modeled on the ICTY, with which it maintains signifi-
cant institutional links.  Like its ICTY counterpart, the ICTR Statute defines 
the jurisdiction and powers of the ICTR.  The crimes on which ICTR exercises 
jurisdiction include genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the Ge-
neva Convention and the fundamental rules of international humanitarian 
law, the violation of which entails individual criminal responsibility.  See id. 
arts. 2–4.  For these crimes, the tribunal exercises concurrent jurisdiction 
with national courts, although the tribunal has primacy over national courts 
for this purpose.  Id. arts. 2–4, 8.  See also MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS, 
supra note 60, at 287–300; VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1–2 THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998); Roy S. Lee, The 
Rwanda Tribunal, 9 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 37 (1996). 
 62. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) (entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome 
Statute of the I.C.C.].  The Statute was adopted with 120 in favor, 7 against, 
and 20 abstentions.  The U.S. was, sadly, among the states that voted against 
the Statute, on the ground, inter alia, that the Statute is “overreaching” in 
that it purports to bind non-state parties through the exercise of jurisdiction 
over their nationals; besides, the U.S. was seeking “an iron-clad veto of juris-
diction over U.S. personnel and officials.”  See M. P. Scharf, Results of the 
Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court, ASIL INSIGHTS, ¶¶ 1–2 
(Aug. 1998), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh23.htm. The alle-
gation that the Statute is overreaching has, however, been refuted; indeed, 
Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch calls it “a gross mischaracterization.” 
Id.  The statute permits the I.C.C. to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of 
non-States Parties where there is a reasonable basis to believe they have 
committed the most serious international crimes.  Id. 
 63. See Rome Statute of the I.C.C., supra note 62, arts. 5–8, for the defini-
tion and description of the various crimes covered in the Statute. 
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There are also numerous treaty-based bodies established to 
implement various UN-inspired human rights treaties.  These 
bodies include the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) charged 
with the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,64 the Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination (“CERD”),65 the Committee Against Torture 
(“CAT”),66 the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women;67 and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child.68  Remarkably, these new judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies, including those mentioned in the intro-
ductory part of this paper, exercise powers and functions that 
are substantially different from those of the past.  For example, 
most of these bodies grant standing to both state and non-state 
entities,69 not only states, as was previously the case.  This 
change is due partly to the expanding concept of the “interna-
tional community as a whole,” which no longer consists exclu-
sively of states but includes non-state entities towards whom 
obligations may exist.70  The phrase now covers such bodies as 
  
 64. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 
pt. IV, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  See generally DOMINIC 
MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1994). 
 65. Established pursuant to the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 18, 660 U.N.T.S. 
195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
 66. Established pursuant to the Convention Against Torture, and Other 
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 17, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
 67. Established pursuant to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature, Dec. 18, 1979, 
art. 17, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 21. 
 68. Established pursuant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
opened for signature, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 43, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 69. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (allowing “individuals 
who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been 
violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies [to] submit a 
written communication to the Committee for consideration”); Optional Proto-
col to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, art. 2, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 
(dealing with the competence of the CEDAW Committee to receive and con-
sider complaints from individuals or groups within its jurisdiction). 
 70. Cf. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts, U.N. GAOR Int’l L. Comm’n, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 54, U.N. 
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the UN, the AU, the EU, and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. Indeed, presently judicial bodies that grant 
standing to non-state entities have outnumbered those with 
traditional jurisdictions limited to disputes between sovereign 
states.71 
III. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED AFRICAN COURTS 
This Part surveys the legal framework for the Human Rights 
Court and the AU Court.  The next Part will discuss whether 
two supra-national courts are needed in contemporary Africa. 
A. The African Human Rights Court 
The African Charter originally did not provide for a court.  
This omission of an international court undermined public con-
fidence in the African human rights system, because without a 
court it was impossible to compel violating states to conform to 
international norms and to provide remedies to victims.72  The 
lack of a court also presented obstacles to the development of 
human rights jurisprudence and the necessary publicity.73  Per-
ceiving these problems, the member states adopted a protocol to 
the African Charter in 1998 to give teeth and meaning to the 
rights guaranteed in the Banjul Charter and “any other rele-
vant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States con-
cerned.”74 According to the Preamble of the Human Rights Pro-
  
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (preferring the phrase “international community as a 
whole,” instead of simply “international community”).  The formulation, how-
ever, does not imply that the international community is a legal person, a 
fallacy exposed by Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in the Namibia 
advisory opinion case.  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Secu-
rity Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 241 (June 21, 1971) (dis-
senting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice); James Crawford et al., The ILC’s Arti-
cles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion 
of the Second Reading, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 973 (2001). 
 71. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 5, at 69. 
 72. See Philip Amoah, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
An Effective Weapon for Human Rights?, 4 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 226, 237–
40 (1992). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 3(1).  For an in-depth com-
mentary and analysis on the Protocol establishing the Human Rights Court, 
see Udombana, Better Late Than Never, supra note 22. 
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tocol, the member states were “[f]irmly convinced that the at-
tainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights requires the establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights to complement and reinforce the 
functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.”75 
The Protocol thus provides the anatomy of the Human Rights 
Court. It allows any aggrieved persons, whether state or non-
state, to bring complaints before the African Human Rights 
Court for violations of the African Charter.  Complaint proce-
dures before international human rights tribunals serve impor-
tant functions: 
First, as a result of considering such a complaint an individ-
ual, whose rights have been violated, may have a remedy 
against the wrong suffered by him, and the violation could be 
stopped and/or compensation paid, etc; second, consideration 
of a complaint may result not only in a remedy for the victim 
of the violation, whose complaint has been considered, but also 
in changes to internal legislation and practice; and third, an 
individual complaint (or more often, a series of complaints) 
may serve as evidence of systematic and/or massive violations 
of certain rights in a given country.76 
According to the Protocol, the Human Rights Court shall con-
sist of eleven judges, who must be nationals of the member 
states of the OAU.77  These judges shall be “elected in an indi-
vidual capacity from among jurists of high moral character and 
of recognized practical, judicial or academic competence and 
experience in the field of human and peoples’ rights.”78  In addi-
tion to having appropriate training or qualifications in law, the 
judges must also be persons of “high moral character.” This mo-
rality requirement supposedly encompasses such elements as 
  
 75. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, 7th preambular para. 
 76. Rein Mullerson, The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: 
The Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR, in MONITORING HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 25, 27 (Arie Bloed et al. eds., 1993). 
 77. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 11(1); cf. ICJ Statute, 
supra note 53, art. 2 (declaring that the Court shall be composed of “inde-
pendent judges elected regardless of nationality”). 
 78. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 11(1). 
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impartiality, integrity, independence, and competence.79 Signifi-
cantly too, the candidates for judges are not to be limited to the 
holders of judicial appointments; reputable academics or juris-
consults may be appointed.  This approach resembles that 
taken by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms80 and the ICJ Statute,81 and is dis-
tinguishable from the requirement of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (“ACHR”) that candidates possess qualifica-
tions required for appointment to the highest judicial offices.82 
Similar to the ICJ composition,83 the judgeship of the African 
Human Rights Court must provide a balanced representation of 
the main African regions and of their principal legal traditions.84  
The main regions of the continent include Northern, Eastern, 
Central, Southern and Western Africa, while the principal legal 
traditions in Africa encompass traditional or customary law, 
Islamic law, common law, and civil law.  This rule of balanced 
representation, in practice, will help to ensure a degree of con-
sistency in the allocation of bench seats to nationals of member 
states.  It may also mitigate any foreseeable reluctance on the 
part of a member state in submitting to the judgments of a 
court that consisted of uneven representation of legal traditions.  
Indeed, to function effectively, the Court must ensure the confi-
  
 79. See NSONGURUA UDOMBANA, THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
COURT: MODELING ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE 38 (2002). 
 80. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 39(3), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, [hereinafter 
ECHR] (“The [judges] shall be of high moral character and must either posses 
the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be juri-
consults of recognised competence.”). 
 81. See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 2 (providing that “[t]he Court shall 
be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their na-
tionality from among persons of high moral character, who possesses the 
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest offices, or are jurisconsults or recognised competence in international 
law”). 
 82. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 52(1), 
1144 U.N.T.S. 144. 
 83. The ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 9, provides that the General As-
sembly and Security Council are to bear in mind, when proceeding to elect the 
judges of the ICJ, that in the body as a whole, the representation of the main 
forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world is assured. 
 84. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 14(2) (“The Assembly 
shall ensure that in the Court as a whole there is representation of the main 
regions of Africa and of their principal legal traditions.”). 
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dence of an eligible party to any action in the court’s impartial-
ity.  Therefore, such party must be satisfied that at least one of 
the judges in the Court has the necessary education, training 
and experience allowing him to fully understand the interests 
and submissions of the region where he comes from.85 
Article 5 of the Human Rights Protocol deals with what com-
mon lawyers call locus standi, that is, who has a right to bring a 
case before the Court.  The article entitles the following five 
categories of claimants to direct access to the Court:  
(a) The Commission; 
(b) The State Party which has lodged a complaint to the Com-
mission; 
(c) The State Party against which the complaint has been 
lodged at the Commission; 
(d) The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights 
violation; 
(e) African Intergovernmental Organisations.86 
From the above provisions, the Commission, States and Afri-
can NGOs will have automatic access to the Court upon a 
state’s ratification of the Protocol.87  In contrast, the Protocol 
provides for only optional jurisdiction with respect to individu-
als and NGOs. It provides that “[t]he Court may entitle relevant 
Non-Governmental Organisations . . . with observer status be-
fore the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly 
before it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of this Protocol.”88  
Notably, the types of NGOs are circumscribed to those “with 
  
 85. See generally Richard Plende, Rules of Procedure in the International 
Court and the European Court, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1991); Judge Manfred 
Lachs, A Few Thoughts on the Independence of Judges of the International 
Court of Justice, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 593 (1987); Edward Gordon, Ob-
servations on the Independence and Impartiality of the Members of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 2 CONN. J. INT’L L. 397 (1987); Shabtai Rosenne, 
Election of Five Members of the ICJ in 1981, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 364 (1982); 
Judge Sir Humphrey Waldock, The International Court of Justice as Seen 
from Bar and Bench, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1983); Leo Gross, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role 
in the International Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 253 (1971). 
 86. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 5(1). 
 87. Id. art. 5(2). 
 88. Id. art. 5(3). 
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observer status with the Commission.”  Thus, the discretion to 
give individuals and NGOs standing lies jointly with the Court 
and the target State.  On the one hand, the Court has discretion 
to grant or deny an individual and NGO standing at will. The 
language of the Protocol is: the Court may entitle[;] . . . and, in 
order for a willing Court to hear a case filed by an individual or 
NGO, the state must have made an express declaration accept-
ing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear such cases.   As Article 34(6) 
provides:  
[A]t the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time 
thereafter, the State shall make a declaration accepting the 
competence of the Court to receive cases under article 5(3) of 
this Protocol.  The Court shall not receive any petition under 
article 5(3) involving a State Party which has not made such a 
declaration.89  
This provision was a compromise in order to induce more Af-
rican states to adopt the Human Rights Protocol.90  The provi-
sion was aimed at achieving an acceptable balance between 
genuine enforcement of fundamental rights set forth thereunder 
and respect for the sovereignty of potential signatory states.91  
Such a cautious compromise, however, was really unnecessary.  
The drafters facing a noble enterprise ought to have drafted the 
Protocol in a way that significantly attacks the problems it 
meant to address.  However, the drafters appeared to have been 
too timid, like a frightened beast shying at its own shadow. 
Article 5(3) in conjunction with Article 34(6) of the Protocol 
has article 25 of the former European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) as its antecedent.  Article 25 provides:  
  
 89. Id. art. 34(b) (emphasis added). 
 90. See Udombana, Better Late Than Never, supra note 22, at 87; Ibrahim 
Ali Badawi El-Sheikh, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of An African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights: Introductory Note, 9 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 943, 947 (1997) 
(“The question of allowing NGOs and individuals to submit cases to the Court 
was one of the most complicated issues during the consideration of the Draft 
Protocol.”). 
 91. See, e.g., 4 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX 
PREPARATOIRES” OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 114 (1977). 
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The Commission may receive petitions . . . from any person, 
non-governmental organizations[92] or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Con-
tracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, pro-
vided that the High Contracting Party against which the com-
plaint has been lodged has declared that it recognises the 
competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.93  
Yet, when the ECHR was adopted, the idea that individuals 
should be able to bring human rights complaints against states 
before an international legal authority was so radical that no 
human rights instruments obliged member states to automati-
cally accept such a procedure.  Time has changed, however, and 
  
 92. The European Commission explained its interpretation of a non-
governmental organization in Ayuntamiento de M v. Spain, App. No. 
15090/89, 68 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 215 (1991).  The applicant 
was the M City Council.  It complained, inter alia, that it had not had a fair 
trial (in breach of the ECHR, supra note 80, arts. 6, 13) when the domestic 
Spanish courts prevented it from establishing a drug addicts’ rehabilitation 
centre in a specified district of the city.  Id. at 213.  The Council claimed that 
it was a ‘non-governmental organisation’, because the system of administra-
tive decentralisation in Spain meant that the council was independent of (cen-
tral) Government.  Id. at 215.  The Commission rejected that argument, de-
claring that the Council was not eligible to make an application under Article 
25.  The Commission: 
[N]otes that local authorities are public law bodies which perform of-
ficial duties assigned to them by the Constitution and by substantive 
law.  They are therefore quite clearly governmental organisations. . . .  
In this connection, the Commission reiterates that in international 
law the expression ‘governmental organisation’ cannot be held to re-
fer only to the Government or the central organs of the State.  Where 
powers are distributed along decentralised lines, it refers to any na-
tional authority which exercises public functions.   
Id. 
 93. ECHR, supra note 80, art. 25.  Cf. ICCPR, supra note 64, art. 41(1), 
providing that:  
A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under 
this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to re-
ceive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party 
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under 
the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be re-
ceived and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has 
made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of 
the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Commit-
tee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declara-
tion. 
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the revised ECHR now gives aggrieved individuals automatic 
standing.94 Furthermore, it seems incongruous that individuals 
have standing to sue their governments before domestic courts 
but cannot do so before an international tribunal, such as the 
African Human Right Court.  
The African Human Rights Court has both contentious and 
advisory jurisdictions.95  Its contentious jurisdiction extends “to 
all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other 
relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States con-
cerned.”96  Similarly, “[a]t the request of a Member State of the 
[AU], the [AU], any of its organs, or any African organisation 
recognised by the [AU], the Court may provide an opinion on 
any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant 
human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of 
the opinion is not related to any matter being examined by the 
Commission.”97  It is not clear, however, what is meant by “any 
African organisation recognised by the OAU”.  Presumably, it 
may refer to different sub-regional organizations, such as the 
ECOWAS.  
Notwithstanding the above-discussed shortcomings, the Pro-
tocol provides the Human Rights Court with broad advisory 
jurisdiction, allowing it to engage in a robust and sustained 
analysis of the meaning of the African Charter and the Human 
Rights Protocol, as well as the compatibility of domestic legisla-
tion and regional initiatives with the human rights norms con-
tained therein.  The advisory opinions of the Inter-American 
Court, for example, have had a significant impact on both pro-
  
 94. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights, May 11, 1994, arts. 1, 34, Europ. T.S. No. 155, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 
943, 943, 962 (1994) [hereinafter Protocol No. 11] (amending Article 24 of the 
former ECHR). 
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organisations or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the 
right set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right. 
Id.  
 95. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, arts. 3–4. 
 96. Id. art. 3(1). 
 97. Id. art. 4. 
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tecting human rights in the Americas and on providing needed 
guidance to domestic courts.98  These advisory opinions have 
also enabled some governments to introduce necessary domestic 
reforms or to abandon legislation that would have breached the 
American Convention on Human Rights without being com-
pelled to do so by contentious decisions stigmatizing them as 
violators of human rights.  As Thomas Buergenthal puts it, 
“[c]ertain governments, in particular those of fragile emerging 
democracies, will find it easier to give effect to an advisory opin-
ion than to comply with a contentious decision in a case they 
lost.”99  Additionally, advisory opinions “can provide speedy judi-
cial responses to questions it would take years to determine in 
contentious proceedings, while avoiding the friction and bitter-
ness judgments in contentious cases are likely to generate in 
some countries.”100 
The Human Rights Court is empowered to draft its Rules of 
Procedure in consultation with the African Commission.101  The 
Rules “shall lay down the detailed conditions under which the 
Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind 
the complementarity between the Commission and the Court.”102  
The Human Rights Protocol provides that the Court shall con-
duct its proceedings in public, although it may also hold in cam-
era hearings in certain cases specified by the Rules of Proce-
dure.103  A party shall be entitled to representation of his case by 
a legal representative of his choice.  Free legal representation 
may be provided where justice so requires.104  This provision will 
  
 98. See, e.g., Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, CSJN 315 Fallos 1492 (1992) (S. Ct. 
of Argentina) (discussed in Thomas Buergenthal, International Tribunals and 
National Courts: The Internationalization of Domestic Adjudication, in RECHT 
ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG (FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BERNHARDT) 
687, 695 (U. Beyerlin et al. eds, 1995). 
 99. Thomas Buergenthal, The European and Inter-American Human 
Rights Courts: Beneficial Interaction, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 123, 131 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
Buergenthal, Beneficial Interaction].  See also generally Thomas Buergenthal, 
The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1985). 
 100. Buergenthal, Beneficial Interaction, supra note 99, at 131. 
 101. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 33.  See also generally 
UDOMBANA, supra note 79. 
 102. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 8. 
 103. Id. art. 10(1). 
 104. Id. art. 10(2). 
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be particularly necessary in a continent where the majority of 
the citizens experience humiliating poverty.  In Africa, the lack 
of resources “is not a special circumstance but rather a common 
occurrence”105 and the unavailability of legal aid may have af-
fected the accessibility of a remedy.  The Commission has, for 
example, stressed that “the lack of legal aid in Africa precludes 
the majority of the African population from asserting their hu-
man rights.”106 
The decisions of the Human Rights Court will be final and 
binding on the parties.  However, the court will have the power 
to review its decisions in light of new evidence under conditions 
to be set out in the Rules of Procedure.107  Unlike the African 
Commission, which merely makes recommendations to the As-
sembly of Heads of States and Government of the continental 
body,108 the Human Rights Court will have the power to issue 
binding decisions and to order compensation or reparations.  
The, Executive Council (former Council of Ministers) of the AU, 
will assist in monitoring the implementation of the court’s deci-
sions.109  This approach is in accord with international law and 
practice.  The binding nature of the decisions rendered by in-
ternational judicial bodies, however, does not equal to effective 
enforcement of such decisions, which is a function to be carried 
out by executive bodies.  Thus, enforcing court decisions is a 
political, rather than a judicial duty.110 
The good news is that, with limited exceptions, states gener-
ally comply with international court judgments. State Parties to 
  
 105. ANKUMAH, supra note 44, at 70.  See also Andrew S. Butler, Legal Aid 
Before Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 360, 
361 (2000). 
 106. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Seminar on the National Implementation of the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Internal Legal Systems in 
Africa, in 6 ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, Annex VIII, ¶ 6(c) (1993) (recommending that “the ques-
tion of legal aid and recourse procedures should be accorded greater attention 
in the work of the African Commission and that States and NGOs should take 
the initiative to promote the establishment of legal aid services”). 
 107. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 28(2)–(3). 
 108. See African Charter, supra note 20, art. 58(2). 
 109. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 29(2).  Similarly, the Coun-
cil of Ministers is entrusted with supervision of the execution of decisions of 
the E.Ct.H.R.  See ECHR, supra note 80, art. 54. 
 110. See Romano, supra note 1, at 714 n.25. 
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the ECHR, for example, have increasingly complied with judg-
ments of the E.Ct.H.R.111 Most international organizations also 
make the execution of such judgments possible by providing for 
some form of sanctions. For example, the UN Charter provides 
that where a party fails to obey the judgment of the ICJ, the 
aggrieved party may apply to the Security Council, “which may, 
if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon 
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”112 It is 
hoped that African States, like their European counterparts, 
will adopt positive attitudes towards the judgment of the Afri-
can Human Rights Court or, for that matter, any continental 
court. 
B. The African Union Court 
1. Establishment and Organization of the Court 
As indicated earlier, the AU Act has not defined the structure 
and mandate of the AU Court. It is, therefore, not yet clear 
what the Court’ anatomy will be, as a separate protocol is ex-
pected to provide further and better particulars, to use the lan-
guage of trial lawyers. Significantly, the Interim Chairperson of 
the AU Commission, Amara Essy, has initiated the process for 
the adoption of a protocol on the Court. Two “brainstorming” 
meetings have already been held, leading to the elaboration of a 
Draft Protocol.113  The Draft Protocol shall form the basis for the 
discussion that follows.  The Court is established to “have a de-
terminative role in the progressive development of African ju-
risprudence through the judicial process and will make a dis-
tinctive contribution to the development of international law.”114 
Meanwhile, the AU Act provides that the judges of the AU 
Court shall be appointed and terminated by the Assembly.115  
Under the Draft Protocol, the Court shall consist of seventeen 
  
 111. See generally Rolv Ryssdall, Opinion: The Coming of Age of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 1 EUROP. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 18 (1996) (ex-
amining the achievements of the E.Ct.H.R. and the challenges it faces).   
 112. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2. 
 113. See Draft Protocol Relating to the Statute, Composition and Functions 
of the Court of Justice of the African Union, CAB/LEG/23.20/45/VOL.II (2003) 
[hereinafter Draft Protocol]. 
 114. Id. at pmbl. 
 115. See AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 9(h). 
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judges, nationals of Member States, provided that no two judges 
shall be nationals of the same State.116  This number, arguably, 
will allow for viability and successful collective functioning of 
the Court. Like the Human Rights Protocol, the Draft Protocol 
provides that the appointment of the Judges must reflect the 
principal legal systems of Africa; and for this purpose, each re-
gion of the continent — that is Northern, Eastern, Central, 
Southern, and Western Africa — “shall be represented by no 
less than two (2) Judges.”117  Like earlier noted, this broad com-
position will give State Parties sufficient confidence to resort to 
the Court. 
The Draft Protocol spells out the qualifications for appoint-
ment, which is not different from those of similar international 
tribunals. It provides that “[t]he Court shall be composed of im-
partial and independent Judges elected from among persons of 
high moral character, who possesses the qualifications required 
in their respective countries for appointment to the highest ju-
dicial offices, or are jurists of recognized competence in interna-
tional law.”118 This formula, which is similar to the provision in 
the ICJ Statute119 and the Revised ECOWAS Treaty,120 “takes in 
professors, professional lawyers, and civil servant appointees.”121 
And in other to avoid any conflict of interest, the Draft Protocol 
provides that a Judge of the Court shall not exercise any politi-
cal or administrative function, or engage in other occupation of 
a professional nature.122  
The Judges shall be elected for a seven-year period, subject to 
re-election once.123 The Draft Protocol, like the Human Rights 
Protocol, staggers their appointment in order “to ensure a 
  
 116. See Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 3(1). 
 117. Id. art. 3(2). 
 118. Id. art. 3(3). 
 119. See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 2 (“The Court shall be composed of 
a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from 
among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications re-
quired in their respective countries for appointment to the highest offices, or 
are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.”). 
 120. See Revised ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 17, art. 20. 
 121. BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 712. 
 122. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 13(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 16(1). 
 123. See id. art. 6(1). 
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measure of continuity of membership of the Court.”124  Conse-
quently, “[t]he term of five (5) Judges elected at the first elec-
tion shall expire at the end of five (5) years and the other 
Judges shall serve the full term.”125  The Draft Protocol also pro-
vides for “adequate gender representation” in the election of the 
Judges,126 similar to the provision in Article 14(3) of the Human 
Rights Protocol.  The empowerment of women, which has been a 
crusade of the human/women rights movements for years, ap-
pears to be yielding some dividends in some areas, though much 
remains to be done in many others.  
The Draft Protocol guarantees the independence of the 
Judges of the Court; such independence “shall be fully ensured 
in accordance with international law and, in particular, the 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judges [(“Basic Principles”)].”127 The Basic Principles were for-
mulated, inter alia, because of the need to consider “the role of 
the judges in relation to the system of justice and to the impor-
tance of their selection, training and conduct.”128  Consequently, 
it is vitally important that appointments to the AU Court 
should be carried out with the utmost circumspection because 
the way in which the judges are selected could make or mar the 
Court’s performance.  Indeed, the Basic Principles provide that 
“[a]ny method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judi-
cial appointments for improper motives.”129  Allied to the provi-
sion on the independence of Judges is the condition for their 
  
 124. UDOMBANA, supra note 79, at 40. 
 125. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 6(1).  Immediately after the first 
election, the Chairperson of the AU Assembly is required to draw lots to de-
termine Judges who will cease to function after the expiration of the initial 
five years.  See id. art. 6(2).  Cf. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 
15. 
 126. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 5(2). 
 127. Id. art. 11(1).  Cf. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 17(1).  
 128. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the 
Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders held at Milan from Aug. 26 to Sept. 6 1985, pmbl., UN Doc. 
A/CONF.121/22Rev. 1 at 59 (1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles]. Principle 4 
provides, inter alia, that “There shall not be any inappropriate or unwar-
ranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by 
the courts be subject to revision.”  Id. Principle 4.  Similarly, “[i]t is the duty of 
each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to 
properly perform its functions.”  Id. Principle 7. 
 129. Id. Principle 10. 
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removal.  Thus, the Draft Protocol provides that “[a] Judge of 
the Court shall not be suspended or removed from office unless 
in the unanimous recommendation of the other Judges, he or 
she no longer fulfils the requisite conditions to be a Judge.”130  
Similar provision is made in the Human Rights Protocol.131  
Meanwhile, Judges engaged in the business of the AU Court, 
like those of the Human Rights Court, are given diplomatic 
privileges and immunities.132  
2. Jurisdiction of the Court 
The AU Act did not clearly define the jurisdiction of the AU 
Court, other than the terse provision on jurisdiction rationae 
materiae, to the effect that that the court “shall be seized with 
matters of interpretation arising from the application or imple-
mentation of this Act.”133  The Court shall also interpret the Pro-
tocol to the AEC Treaty on establishing the Pan-African Par-
liament (“PAP”), which was adopted by the OAU Assembly on 
March 2, 2001, at its Fifth Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, 
Libya.134  Pending the Court’s establishment, interpretative 
matters over both the AU Act and the PAP Protocol shall be 
submitted to the AU Assembly, “which shall decide [these mat-
ters] by a two-thirds majority.”135  It is not clear, however, how 
  
 130. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 10(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 18(1).  See also Basic Principles, supra note 128, Principle 19 (provid-
ing that “[a]ll disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be deter-
mined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct”). 
 131. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 18. 
 132. See Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 12.  Cf. Human Rights Protocol, 
supra note 19, art. 17(3). 
 133. AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 26.  Cf. TREATY: TREATY ON EUROPEAN 
UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), art. 220 (on 
the ECJ duties) [hereinafter TEU]. 
 134. See Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Commu-
nity (“AEC”) Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2001, art. 20, at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/papprot.htm [hereinafter PAP Proto-
col].  Twenty-one Member States have so far signed the Protocol while three 
countries have ratified it.  See Dep’t of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Af-
rica, Transition from the OAU to the African Union, at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.html (last visited Aug. 
11, 2002).  The Protocol will enter into force after the deposit of the instru-
ments of ratification by a simple majority of the member states.  PAP Proto-
col, supra, art. 22. 
 135. AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 26; PAP Protocol, supra note 134, art. 20. 
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the Assembly — composed predominantly of political leaders — 
would objectively interpret or even overturn their own deci-
sions. 
The Draft Protocol, however, vests the AU Court with both 
contentious and advisory jurisdiction. 
a. Contentious Jurisdiction and Procedure 
The Draft Protocol covers not only the jurisdiction rationae 
materiae136 but also rationae personiae.  For example, the Court 
shall have jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the in-
terpretation of a treaty; questions of international law; the exis-
tence of any act that would constitute a breach of an interna-
tional obligation, if established; and the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obliga-
tion.137  This is without prejudice to the right of the AU Assem-
bly to “confer on the Court power to assume jurisdiction over 
any dispute other than those referred to in [the Protocol].”  This 
savings clause leaves the mandate of the court wide open to ad-
judicate any matter.138 
As regards jurisdiction rationae personiae, the Draft Protocol 
provides that all Member States of the AU “are ipso facto par-
ties to the Statute of the Court,”139 though a non-member State 
may also access the Court “on conditions to be determined by 
the Assembly in each case.”140  The Draft Protocol, in line with 
“the changing structure of international law,”141 gives the right 
of standing to a staff member of the AU.  Thus, where a staff of 
the Union is adjudged by an internal administrative tribunal 
“to be in breach of his or her obligation not to seek or receive 
instructions from any government or from any government or 
from any other authority external to the Union,” such a staff 
“shall have a right to appeal to the Court.”142  
There is a very close connection, in terms of the functions, be-
tween the AU Court and the AEC Court of Justice (“AEC 
  
 136. See Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 20(1) 
 137. Id. art. 20(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 36. 
 138. See Peter, supra note 28, at 120. 
 139. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 18(1). 
 140. Id. art. 18(2). 
 141. See passim WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964). 
 142. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 18(3). 
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Court”), provided for in the AEC Treaty but not yet established.  
Indeed, the AEC Treaty provides certain detailed information 
on its proposed Court, which allows some analysis and compari-
son with the AU Court.  Like the AU Act, the AEC Treaty es-
tablishes an AEC Court to interpret its provisions.143  Again, like 
the AU Act, the AEC Treaty provides that the statutes, mem-
bership, procedure and other matters relating to the AEC Court 
shall be determined by the Assembly of the AEC in a protocol 
relating to the Court.144 
The AEC Court has “a very limited mandate” and is “en-
trusted with three basic tasks.”145  First, the Court will ensure 
adherence to law by interpreting and applying the AEC 
Treaty.146  Thus, failing an amicable settlement, parties to a 
“dispute regarding the interpretation of the application of the 
provisions of [the AEC] Treaty” may refer the mater to the 
Court.147  Second, the Court will provide advisory opinions re-
quested by either the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment or the Council of Ministers (now the Executive Council).148  
Third, it will adjudicate disputes submitted to it pursuant to 
the AEC Treaty provisions.  Thus, the Court shall entertain 
“actions brought by a Member State or the Assembly on 
grounds of the violation of the provisions of this Treaty, or of a 
decision or a regulation or on grounds of lack of competence or 
abuse of powers by an organ, an authority or a Member State . . 
. .”149  The Assembly may also refer any dispute concerning the 
AEC Protocol on Regional Economic Communities (“REC”) to 
the Court as a “last resort.”150  
  
 143. See AEC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 18(1).   
 144. Id. art. 20. 
 145. Peter, supra note 28, at 119. 
 146. See AEC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 18(2).  
 147. Id. art. 87(1). 
 148. Id. art. 18(3)(b).  
 149. Id. art. 18(3)(a).  Cf. TEU, supra note 133, art. 170 (providing that “[a] 
Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfill 
an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court of Jus-
tice”).  The TEU, however, provides that a Member State must first take a 
matter to the Commission, before proceeding to the ECJ.  Id. 
 150. See Protocol on the Relationship Between the African Economic Com-
munity and the Regional Economic Communities, Feb. 25, 1998, art. 30, re-
printed in 10 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157 (1998). 
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It remains to add that, in view of the apparent conflict be-
tween the AEC Treaty and the AU Act,151 the AEC Court will be 
subsumed in the AU Court. This interpretation is fortified by 
the fact that the AU Act establishes the AU “in conformity with 
the ultimate objectives of the Charter of [the OAU] and the pro-
visions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Com-
munity.”152  The AU Act did not abrogate the AEC Treaty but 
only abrogated the OAU Charter.153  In fact, through its Sirte 
initiative of 2001 the AU intended to speed up the economic in-
tegration process that the AEC Treaty started. 
Mutatis mutandis, Article 19 of the Draft Protocol reproduces 
the provisions of the AEC Treaty on the functions of the Court.  
However, unlike the AEC Treaty, the Draft Protocol is silent on 
amicable settlement of disputes by Member States.  The AEC 
Treaty, on its part, encourages parties to seek amicable solu-
tions before bringing their claims to the Court. This preference 
for settlement, as noted earlier, is a hallmark of traditional Af-
rican jurisprudence.154  However, like the AEC Treaty, the Draft 
Protocol provides that the AU Court shall “ensure the adher-
ence to law in the interpretation and application of the Consti-
tutive Act.”155  The phrase “the interpretation and application of” 
— which refers to “two distinct terms relating to two distinct 
operations”156 — has been given a broad interpretation to cover 
any dispute between states concerning the responsibility of one 
  
 151. See AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 33(2) (“The provisions of this Act shall 
take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of 
the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.”). 
 152. Sirte Declaration, Org. Afr. Unity, Assembly of Heads of State, 4th 
Extraordinary Sess., ¶ 8(i), EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1, available at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirte.htm.  Cf. AU ACT, supra note 23, 
pmbl., ¶ 6 (being “[c]onvinced of the need to accelerate the process of imple-
menting the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in order to 
promote the socio-economic development of Africa”). 
 153. See AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 33(1). 
 154. See AEC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 87(1).  Cf. SADC Treaty, supra 
note 15, art. 32 (providing that disputes arising from the interpretation and 
application of the SADC Treaty should be settled in a friendly manner.  Only 
if an amicable attempt fails, should the dispute be referred to the SADC Tri-
bunal.). 
 155. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 19(1). Cf. AEC Treaty, supra note 
25, art. 18(2). 
 156. SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945–1986, 
at 224 (1989) [hereinafter ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES].  
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of them for an alleged breach of an international obligation, 
whatever the origin of such an obligation.157  The Nicaragua 
Case was the “first significant judicial pronouncement [of the 
ICJ] regarding the meaning of ‘application.’”158  In that case, the 
Court maintained that the appraisal of conduct in the light of 
the relevant principles of the treaty pertains to the application 
of the law rather than to its interpretation; and this must be 
undertaken in the context of the general evaluation of the facts 
which are established in relation to the applicable law.159 
Finally, the AU Assembly is empowered to “confer on the 
Court power to assume jurisdiction over any dispute other than 
those referred to in [the Protocol].”160  This implies that the As-
sembly may refer to the Court disputes between natural or legal 
persons.  Indeed, as the European experience has indicated, 
natural and legal persons have proved to be effective guardians 
of the European Community legal order and have contributed 
significantly to the evolution of the EC law.161  Similarly, the 
future AU Court should also be accessible to individuals.  As a 
court for the African Union with all its ambitious goals, the AU 
Court must be able to protect the “state of law.”  It is, therefore, 
vitally important that individuals are able to appeal “directly to 
the Court against an act of one of the institutions of the Union 
that infringes [on] their basic rights.”162 
  
 157. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.S.), 1924 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 16, 29 (Aug. 30); Military and Paramilitary Activities 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, ¶¶ 81, 83, at 427–28 (Nov. 26); Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595, ¶¶ 30–32, at 615–17 (July 11); 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, ¶ 51, at 820 (Dec. 12); Questions 
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1998 
I.C.J. 115, ¶¶ 23–24, at 123 (Feb. 27). 
 158. ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 156, at 
224. 
 159. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 6, ¶ 225, at 117. 
 160. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 20(2).  Cf. AEC Treaty, supra note 
25, art. 18(4). 
 161. See, e.g., Christopher Harding, The Private Interest in Challenging 
Community Action, 5 EUR. L. REV. 354, 357 (1980); Carol Harlow, Towards a 
Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice, 12 Y.B. EUR. L. 357 (1992). 
 162. See, e.g., Leo Tindemans, L’ Union Europeenne, Bulletin des Commu-
nites Europeennes (Supp. 1/76, 1976). 
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The Draft Protocol spells out the procedure to be followed in 
contentious cases; and it consists of two parts: written and 
oral.163  Unlike most domestic legal systems, written pleadings 
submitted to international tribunals usually contain a very full 
statement both of the facts considered relevant by the party and 
the arguments as to the law. Documentary evidence is also usu-
ally annexed.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the Draft Pro-
tocol provides that written proceedings “shall consist of com-
munication to the parties and to the institutions of the Union 
whose decisions are in dispute, of applications, statements of 
the case, defenses and observations and of replies if any, as well 
as all papers and documents in support, or of certified copies.”164  
The oral proceedings, on the other hand, “shall, if necessary, 
consist of hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents, 
counsel and advocates.”165  
Except for proceedings in arbitration cases, which “are almost 
invariably conducted in private,”166 oral proceedings of most 
courts or tribunals are heard in public.  Thus, the Draft Protocol 
provides that hearings shall be in public, unless the Court de-
cides otherwise or the parties demand that the public be not 
admitted.167  
The Draft Protocol empowers the AU Court to indicate, “if it 
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional meas-
ures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of 
the parties.”168  Notice of such measures must be given to the 
parties and to the Chairperson of the Commission.169  Interim 
  
 163. Draft Protocol, supra note113, art. 25(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 43(1). 
 164. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 25(2).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 43(2). 
 165. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 25(5). 
 166. H. W. A. Thirlway, Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals, in 
III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1129 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 
2000) (arguing, however, that there seems to be no reason whey arbitration 
cases should not be in public if the parties so wish, citing the 1977 Beagle 
Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), where the tribunal held a public 
inaugural hearings). 
 167. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 27.  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, 
art. 46. 
 168. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 23(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 41. 
 169. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 23(2). 
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measures are adjuncts of the judicial process and “reflect the 
perennial judicial concern for effective decision-making.”170  
They may be mandatory in nature; they may be injunctive or 
restraining.171  Either way, they rest on “the wide and universal 
recognition of the enjoining powers of courts as an inherent part 
of their jurisdiction.”172  They serve to prevent a party to a dis-
pute from prejudicing the final outcome of the process de facto 
by an arbitrary act before a judgment has been reached, thereby 
rendering ineffective any judgment of a tribunal.  Indeed, in-
terim measures “are of the utmost importance in any judicial 
proceeding, because without this instrument, the final outcome, 
that is, the judgment, would lack any efficacy or such efficacy 
would be very limited, in addition to the serious or irreversible 
injury the parties might suffer.”173 
All decisions of the AU Court shall be by a simple majority; 
and, in the event of equality of votes, the President or presiding 
Judge shall have a casting vote.174  However, separate or dis-
senting opinions are permitted.175  Like that of the Human 
Rights Court and, indeed, the AEC Court, the judgment of the 
AU Court “shall be final and without appeal.”176  It shall, how-
ever, have no binding force “except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case.”177  The implication of this provi-
sion, which restates Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, is that the 
doctrine of judicial precedent will have a narrower application 
in the legal system of the AU than it has in municipal (common) 
law.  There is an exception though; decisions on the interpreta-
  
 170. Peter Goldsworth, Interim Measures of Protection in the International 
Court of Justice, 68 A.J.I.L. 258, 258 (1974). 
 171. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Terhan Case, Pro-
visional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Dec. 15). 
 172. Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional 
Measures (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Serbia and Montenegro)), 
Order of Sept. 13, 1993 ICJ REP. 325, 379. 
 173. Héctor Fix-Zamudio, The European and the Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights: A Brief Comparison, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 507, 519 (Paul Mahoney ed., 2000). 
 174. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 35.  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, 
art. 55. 
 175. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 37. 
 176. Id. art. 38.  Cf. Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, 28(1); AEC 
Treaty, supra note 25, art. 87(2). 
 177. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 39. 
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tion and application of the Constitutive Act shall be binding on 
Member States and organs of the AU.178  The Draft Protocol pro-
vides that in the event of disputes as to the meaning or scope of 
a judgment, the Court shall construe it at the request of any 
party.179  The jurisprudence of the ICJ shows that “[t]his is 
rarely done, since the principle is that there should be an end to 
litigation and that judgments should not be freely expected to 
be modified except for good cause and also for the purpose of 
putting its meaning or scope beyond all doubt.”180  
Like the ICJ and the Human Rights Court, the AU Court will 
have the power to revise its own judgment in light of new evi-
dence.  Such “new evidence,” however, must be “of such nature 
as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment 
was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming 
revision [and] provided that such ignorance was not due to neg-
ligence.”181  The application for revision should be made within 
six months of the discovery of the new fact.182  Before proceeding 
with revision, the Court shall make a judgment “expressly re-
cording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has 
such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declar-
ing the revision admissible on this ground.”183  Furthermore, in 
admitting proceedings in revision, “[t]he Court may require 
prior compliance with the terms of the judgment.”184 
The Draft Protocol allows a Member State to apply for per-
mission to intervene in a case before the AU Court should such 
a member “consider that it has an interest of a legal nature, 
  
 178. See id. art. 40.  Cf. AEC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 19 (providing that 
the judgment of the AEC Court is binding on the AEC member states and 
organs). 
 179. See id. art. 41.  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 60. 
 180. TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS, UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE WORLD 
COURT 120 (1989) [hereinafter ELIAS, UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE 
WORLD COURT].  
 181. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 42(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 61; Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 28(3); Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the European Community, art. 40, 298 U.N.T.S. 147 (as 
amended by Council Decision 88/591, 1989 O.J. (C 215) 1) [hereinafter ECJ 
Statute]; Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities of 19 June 1991, art. 102, 1991 O.J. (L 176) 7 [herein-
after ECJ Rules of Procedure]. 
 182. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 42(4). 
 183. Id. art. 42(2). 
 184. Id. art. 42(2) 
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which may be affected by the decision in the case.”185  Generally, 
what is an interest of a legal nature is a matter of law and fact186 
that has to be decided after the abduction of proof that the al-
leged legal interest is truly involved.187 
b. Advisory Jurisdiction and Procedure 
The AU Court is fitted with advisory jurisdiction “on any le-
gal question.”188  The category of legal persons entitled to re-
quest the advisory opinion of the Court is elastic.  It includes 
the Assembly and such other organs and specialized agencies of 
the AU, if authorized by the Assembly to make such request 
“regarding interpretation of the Constitutive Act or any decision 
or regulation enacted under the Act.189  These other “family” 
members include the Executive Council, the Pan-African Par-
liament, the ECOSOCC, the Commission, any of the Financial 
Institutions or any other organ of the Union.190  As earlier noted, 
advisory opinions can only be sought on legal questions, 
whether “concrete or abstract.”191  However, it is no objection to 
the giving of such opinion “that the questions submitted to the 
Court for advice involve issues of fact, provided that the ques-
tions remain nonetheless essentially legal questions.”192  Fur-
thermore, the questions put to the Court may involve identifica-
tion of the factual and legal background; and the legal questions 
  
 185. Id. art. 43.  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 62. 
 186. For an explanation of the phrase “an interest of a legal nature,” see the 
separate opinion of Judge Oda in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, 1990 
I.C.J. 92, 137 (Sept. 13), which was the first time that an intervention under 
Article 62 of the ICJ Statute was permitted. 
 187. See, e.g., Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, 1985 I.C.J. 33 (June 3) 
(in which the ICJ, in 1984, refused the request by Italy to intervene in the 
maritime dispute because, according to the Court, Italy did not show any in-
terest of a legal nature that should enable it to intervene in the dispute). 
 188. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 46(1).  
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. arts. 19(2)(b), 46(1).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 65(1); Hu-
man Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 4(1).  
 191. IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 460 (1994). 
 192. Id. at n.10 (citing Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 
12 (Oct. 16)).  
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“may not necessarily correspond precisely to the questions thus 
submitted to the Court.”193 
The procedure for advisory opinions is that a written re-
quest must be laid before the Court. Such request “shall contain 
an exact statement of the question upon which the opinion is 
required and shall be accompanied by all relevant documents 
likely to be of assistance to the Court.”194  The Registrar then 
notifies all Member States “that the Court shall be prepared to 
accept, within a time limit fixed by the President, written sub-
mission or to hear oral submissions relating to the question.”195  
When all written and oral submissions have been made, the 
Court “shall deliver its advisory opinion in open court, notice 
having been given to the Member States and the Chairperson of 
the Commission.”196 
Undoubtedly, the advisory opinions of the AU Court, like 
those of the ICJ,197 will, beside the immediate benefit to the ad-
visee, provide guidance to domestic courts of AU States.  It will 
also enable Member States to introduce necessary domestic re-
forms or to oppose legislation that would be in breach of the AU 
Act.  Governments also usually “find it easier to give effect to 
advisory opinion than to comply with a contentious decision in a 
case they lost.”198  Furthermore, advisory opinions “can provide 
speedy judicial responses to questions it would take years to 
determine in contentious proceedings, while avoiding the fric-
tion and bitterness judgments in contentious cases are likely to 




 193. Id. (citing Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 
March 25, 1981 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73 (Dec. 20)). 
 194. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 46(2).  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 
53, art. 65(2). 
 195. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 47.  Note that the ICJ Statute re-
quires the Registrar to notify not only “all states entitled to appear before the 
Court” but also international organizations considered by the Court to be able 
to furnish information on the subject.  See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 66. 
 196. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 48.  Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 53, 
art. 67. 
 197. For an example of advisory opinions rendered by the ICJ, see Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 266 (July 8). 
 198. Buergenthal, Beneficial Interaction, supra note 99, at 131. 
 199. Id. 
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3. Sources of Law 
Writers in international law usually distinguish between the 
formal sources and the material sources of law.  The former are 
those legal procedures and methods of creation of rules of gen-
eral application that are legally binding on the addressees.  The 
material sources, on the other hand, provide evidence of the 
existence of rules, which, when proved, have the status of le-
gally binding rules of general application.200  The Draft Protocol 
lists the literary sources of the law that the AU Court “shall 
have regard to”201 both in its contentious and advisory jurisdic-
tion.202  They include the AU Act and treaties expressly recog-
nized by contesting states203 — sources of mutual obligations of 
the parties.  Another source is international custom, as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted by law.204  The ICJ describes 
customary international law as “the generalization of the prac-
tice of States.”205  
Other sources that the Draft Protocol enumerates are general 
principles of law recognized by African States and teachings of 
publicists.206  These provisions represent evidences of the exis-
tence of consensus among African States concerning particular 
rules of practice.  Significantly, they are reproductions of Article 
38(1) of the ICJ Statute, itself “widely recognised as the most 
authoritative statement as to the sources of international 
law.”207  The list, however, is not exhaustive, as it omits other 
important contemporary processes of international lawmaking, 
such as soft laws.  Soft laws “are significant in signaling the 
evolution and establishment of guidelines, which ultimately 
  
 200. See BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 1. 
 201. See Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 21. 
 202. See, e.g., id. art. 49 (providing that “[I]n the exercise of its advisory 
jurisdiction, the Court shall be guided by the provisions of the present Statute 
which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to 
be applicable”). 
 203. See id. art. 21(a)–(b). 
 204. See id. art. 21(c). 
 205. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 191 (Dec. 18) 
(Judge Read). 
 206. See Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 21(d)–(e). 
 207. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1997) (noting further that 
Article 38(1) “expresses the universal perception as to the enumeration of 
sources of international law”). 
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may be converted into legally binding rules.”208  As a compro-
mise, there should be an exception, similar to Article 38(2) of 
the ICJ Statute, giving the Court power to decide a case ex 
aequo et bono, if the parties so agree. 
IV. TWO COURTS OR ONE COURT? 
This Part examines arguments for and against two or more 
supra-national judicial institutions in Africa. Assuming, with-
out prejudice to later conclusions, that the multiplication of 
courts in a collective Africa is a desirable goal, what are the 
benefits of such an exercise?  On the other hand, is there a cyni-
cal notion on the part of African leaders, even if remote, that 
such an exercise will undermine the authority of these courts 
and dilute their potential power.  What are the interests — offi-
cial and non-official — of the different African countries on 
these issues, especially in a continent where political, ideologi-
cal and cultural considerations remain paramount?  This part 
examines some of these issues. 
Subparts A and B address two arguments supporting a two-
court regime.  The first argument maintains that if two courts 
could thrive in Europe, they can also succeed in Africa.  The 
second argument contends that multiple courts would speed up 
the progressive development of international law in Africa 
through judicial decisions.  Subpart C points out the funding 
problem challenging the two-court system.  While this article 
makes every attempt possible to balance the debate, it does not 
remain neutral.  The thesis of this paper is that Africa does not 
need two or more courts and that the AU should settle for a sin-
gle court to interpret all African legal instruments and adjudi-
cate conflicts arising therefrom.  Having two courts in Africa 
will not only present financial difficulty, but will also unneces-
sarily duplicate efforts and even create potential inconsistency.   
A. Arguments Based on the European Experience 
Europe provides a classic example of successful regional ex-
periments in terms of both economic integration and human 
rights protection.  European success has inspired other regions 
that are grappling with the problems of integration in an age of 
  
 208. Id. at 98. 
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globalization and human rights protection at the regional level.  
For example, the ACHR and its two judicial institutions, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, were largely structured 
along the lines of the European experiment. 
Europe created the impetus for a permanent regional inter-
national court through its adoption of the Treaty of Paris estab-
lishing the European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”).209  
This treaty, established, inter alia, an independent court, the 
Court of Justice, to interpret and enforce its provisions. On 
March 25, 1957, the Treaties of Rome were adopted to set up 
the European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (“EAEC” or “Euratom”).210  These 
treaties established a framework to give more freedom of action 
to the Community institutions.211  The two new communities 
were also permitted to use the Court of Justice.  The EU 
Treaty212 has retained as an organ of the EU the Court of Jus-
tice, now known as the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).  
The ECJ has operated in Europe alongside the European 
Court of Human Rights (“E.Ct.H.R.”).  In 1959, pursuant to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of 
Europe213 set up the E.Ct.H.R. located in Strasbourg, France.214  
  
 209. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 
18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.  The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community, which entered into force on July 25, 1952, provided “for the 
control of the coal and steel industries of the six signatory states by a High 
Authority, [with] the necessary powers to carry out its mandate.”  PHILIP 
RAWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 
(2001).  This was the first “significant step along the road of European inte-
gration.”  Id.   
 210. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169.  (These treaties entered into 
force on January 1, 1958). 
 211. See RAWORTH, supra note 138, at 3. 
 212. See TEU, supra note 133, art. 4. 
 213. The Council of Europe was established in 1949.  See Statute of the 
Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103.  The Council’s aim was, and 
remains, “to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common 
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”  Id. art. 1(a).  
The Council seeks to pursue this aim “through the organs of the Council by 
discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common 
action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative mat-
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The establishment of the E.Ct.H.R. was the first step towards a 
collective enforcement of human rights in Europe.  The ECHR 
created, inter alia, a right of individual petition, i.e., a right of 
individuals and organizations to challenge their governments 
for human rights violations.  Thus, individuals were able to 
take their cases to the European Commission of Human Rights 
(established in 1954) and then to the E.Ct.H.R.  Until 1998, the 
Convention mandated individual litigants to pass through the 
Commission before getting to the Court.  However, Protocol 11 
to ECHR brought about fundamental changes in the system.215 
The reforms were aimed at resolving several of the system’s 
weaknesses.  First, the inability of individuals to petition the 
Court conflicted with the principle of “equality of arms.”  Sec-
ond, the commission was faced with a growing number of appli-
cations216 and with increasingly complex cases.  In addition, the 
system could not function efficiently with thirty-four Contract-
ing States, since it was established to work with ten or twelve 
Member Countries. Finally, there was the time consideration: 
by 1993, an average case took more than five years to move 
through the Convention organs.217 
Consequently, the European Human Rights Commission was 
abolished on October 31, 1998 and the old, part-time Court was 
reorganized to become a permanent, full-time, Court, retaining 
its name as the E.Ct.H.R.  There was, however, a transitional 
period of one year before the protocol entered into force in order 
to allow the Commission to dispose of cases that had been de-
clared admissible.218 
  
ters and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.”  Id. art. 1(b). 
 214. See ECHR, supra note 80, art. 19(b). 
 215. See Protocol No. 11, supra note 94, art. 34. 
 216. In 1993, 2,087 cases were registered, as opposed to 404 in 1981.  See 
Françoise Roth & Claudia Martín, The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights: A System in Motion, at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/ 
v2i2/eurosystem.htm (last visited May 27, 2003). 
 217. See id. 
 218. On the European system and its processes, see, e.g., PHILIP LEACH, 
TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2000); ALASTAIR 
MOWBRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 778 (2001); D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 648 (1995); Henry G. Schermers, The Eleventh Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 19 EUR. L. REV. 367, 369 (1994); Ru-
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Curiously, the European policy makers deem it desirable to 
introduce a human rights component into the existing EU 
structure, which is essentially economic in nature.  In Decem-
ber 2000, the EU adopted a Human Rights Charter,219 which, 
undoubtedly, raises issues of potential conflict with the 
E.Ct.H.R. Besides, although the Charter specifies that it is ad-
dressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due 
regard for the principle of subsidiarity,”220 “it remains unclear 
what the relationship between subsidiarity and human rights 
will prove to be in the European Union.”221 
It is not clear which of these developments has influenced Af-
rican countries in their current designs of African judicial insti-
tutions.  What is clear is that Africa is currently embarking on 
economic and political integration.  Thus, it appears natural for 
the AU to emulate the European experience of having a sepa-
rate human rights court and a court of justice.  A seemingly 
logical, but not necessarily correct, argument maintains that if 
the experiment has succeeded in Europe, it can also prosper in 
Africa.  This is probably the reason why Africa’s integration 
agenda is closely patterned after the European model.  The ar-
gument also explains the continent’s desire to have both a 
  
dolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 145 (1995). 
 219. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364) 1. 
 220. Id. art. 51.  Subsidiarity, in the context of the ECHR, has been ex-
plained to mean “a distribution of powers between the supervisory machinery 
and the national authorities which has necessarily to be weighed in favour of 
the latter.”  Ryssdall, supra note 111, at 24.  Subsidiarity, according to Ryss-
dall, reflects three basic features: 
First, the list of rights and freedoms is not exhaustive, so that the 
Convention States are free to provide better protection under their 
law or any other agreement (Article 60). Secondly, the Convention 
does not impose uniform rules; it lays down standards of conduct and 
leaves the choice of the means of implementation to the Contracting 
State. Finally, as the court and Commission have repeatedly stressed, 
the national authorities are in a better position than the supervisory 
bodies to strike the right balance between the sometimes conflicting 
interests of the Community and the protection of the fundamental 
rights of the individual. 
Id. at 24–25. 
 221. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 97 A.J.I.L. 38, 39 (2003). 
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Court of Justice and a Court of Human Rights, in addition to 
many other institutions.  Indeed, converts are sometimes more 
zealous than those brought up in the faith.  However, the issue 
of establishing an African supra-national judicial system is not 
so straightforward, and mere emulation of the European ex-
periment may not work in Africa.  
To start with, the historical experiences of the two continents 
are fundamentally different exactly where they are superficially 
similar.  What motivates Africa’s current integration endeavor 
differs from the European motivation.  The architects of the 
European movement sought, by emphasizing common tradi-
tions and common interests, “to have the European nations 
work together rather than just living together or working 
against one another, as in the past.”222  The movement towards 
European unification started after World War II and was con-
centrated mainly in Western Europe.223  These countries were 
motivated to unify because of the tragic and costly war, the fear 
of Nazi Germany, and the apprehension of communist expan-
sion.  In contrast, Africa’s current movement has more to do 
with the challenges resulting from globalization than the 
euphoria of unity.  The socio-economic origin of the AU ema-
nated from the desire of African leaders to meet the present 
challenges of globalization and regional integration.  Facing 
increasing globalization, the leaders saw the need to develop 
appropriate strategies.  This search for an original solution for 
Africa led to the revision of the OAU’s objectives, mandate and 
mode of functioning, and also caused re-orientation of the 
strategies addressing the globalization challenge.  This search 
further explains the flood of binding and non-binding instru-
ments that the continent has churned out very recently, includ-
ing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”).224 
  
 222. Christian Kohler, The Court of Justice of the European Communities 
and the European Court of Human Rights, in SUPRANATIONAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN EUROPE: FUNCTIONS AND SOURCES 15, 18 (Igor I. 
Kavass ed., 1992). 
 223. See VISIONS OF EUROPEAN UNITY (Philomena Murray & Paul Rich eds., 
1996) (discussing ideas of European unity, from the inter-war period to the 
present). 
 224. See New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Oct. 2001), at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/events/nepad.pdf [hereinafter NEPAD]. NEPAD is: 
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In addition, the European political structure is different from 
that in Africa.  In Europe, two courts had to be established to 
cater for two distinct bodies: one is the Council of Europe, which 
created the E.Ct.H.R., and the other is the European Union, 
which established the ECJ.  Although all member states of the 
EU are members of the Council of Europe, the reverse is not the 
case.  There are presently fifteen member states of the EU225 
while the Council of Europe has over forty member states, all of 
which are now signatories to the ECHR.226  In contrast, Africa 
has always had one continental body, the OAU, which meta-
morphosed into the AU.  The signatories to the Human Rights 
Protocol establishing the Human Rights Court are the same 
countries that signed the AU Act creating the AU Court.  It is 
very likely that the same parties will adopt and ratify the pro-
posed Protocol on the AU Court.  Therefore, the dichotomy of 
courts’ parental bodies does not exist in Africa.   
There is still another reason why the European experiment 
cannot be transported to Africa wholesale. Georges Abi-Saab 
summarizes the reason in these thoughtful words: 
Every legal order has its own frontiers that separate it from 
other legal orders, because it has a different basis of legiti-
  
[A] pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm 
and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate 
poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collec-
tively, on a path of sustainable economic growth and development, 
and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy 
and body politic. 
Id. at ¶ 67.  See also generally Nsongurua Udombana, How Should We Then 
Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 293 (2002) (examining the phenomena of globalization and the chal-
lenges of the NEPAD and calling on African countries to consolidate democ-
racy and sound economic management on the continent).  The author, in a 
previous article, also called on the international community to respond posi-
tively to Africa’s new initiative and for an equitable implementation of norma-
tive standards that govern the various aspects of globalization.  Id.  See also 
Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integra-
tion in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185 (2002). 
 225. These countries are Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Austria, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. 
 226. These include all countries of the former Western Europe and most 
countries of the former Eastern Europe. 
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macy and different mechanisms for creating, applying, and en-
forcing its rules.  In other words, every legal order generates 
and specifies its rules in different ways, with different results, 
and these rules and procedures ultimately derive their legiti-
macy from the fact of belonging to this legal order.  It consti-
tutes a unicum: an entity held together by its own internal 
cohesive forces, while remaining separate and distinguishable 
from other legal orders.227 
Africa must find its own rhythm and cohesive forces to build 
its institutions.  The AU cannot transplant the European model 
of integration, including the paraphernalia of courts and other 
institutions, to Africa and expect it to flourish without carefully 
tailoring it to the specific needs of the region.  Africa does not 
need multiple courts or institutions in order “to eradicate pov-
erty and to place their countries . . . on a path of sustainable 
economic growth and development, and, at the same time, to 
participate actively in the world economy and body politic.”228  
What Africa needs for sustainable development is a good and 
responsible government, which can be achieved with or without 
multiplication of institutions including courts.  In the nectar 
and ambrosia of their sunny paradise, African leaders should 
recognize that the continent’s past and present experiences, 
including unremitting conflicts, and future expectations do not 
support two supra-national courts, at least for now.  
B. Arguments Based on the Development of International Law in 
Africa 
Judicial decisions have long been recognized as a “subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.”229  Although 
strictly speaking, judicial decisions are not formal sources of 
law, they are sometimes regarded as authoritative evidence of 
the state of law.  A unanimous, or almost unanimous, decision 
has a role in the progressive development of the law; which is to 
say that a coherent body of jurisprudence will naturally have 
important consequences for the law.230  Therefore, it seems logi-
  
 227. Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding 
Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 919, 920 (1999). 
 228. NEPAD, supra note 224, ¶ 1. 
 229. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 52, art. 38(1)(d). 
 230. See BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 2. 
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cal to argue that having more courts in the international arena 
is beneficial to the development of international law.231  How-
ever, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals also 
has shortcomings.  Particularly in a collective Africa, multiple 
courts might lead to conflicts in jurisdiction and confusion in 
the doctrinal development of international law.  There is a dan-
ger that different institutions may give the same rule of law 
different interpretations in different cases.  Charney states on 
the problem: 
Not only may a cacophony of views on the norms of interna-
tional law undermine the perception that an international le-
gal system exists, but if like cases are not treated alike, the 
very essence of a normative system of law will be lost.  Should 
this develop, the legitimacy of international law as a whole 
will be placed at risk.232 
The President of the ICJ has added his voice to these con-
cerns:  
The proliferation of international courts gives rise to a serious 
risk of conflicting jurisprudence, as the same rule of law might 
be given different interpretations in different cases . . . .  A 
dialogue among judicial bodies is crucial.  The International 
Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions, stands ready to apply itself to this end if it receives the 
necessary resources.233   
  
 231. Even in the ordinary state of human affairs, it has been said that 
“[t]wo are better than one, [b]ecause they have a good reward for their labor. 
For if they fall, one will lift up his companion. But woe to him who is alone 
when he falls, [f]or he has no one to help him up.”  Ecclesiastes 4:9–10 (New 
King James). 
 232. Charney, Impact of International Courts, supra note 11, at 699.  How-
ever, his research seem to show that the current system of various tribunals 
does not appear to disrupt the cohesion of international law, though he also 
admits that complete uniformity of decisions is impossible:  
[I]n those core areas of international law, the different international 
tribunals of the late twentieth century do share relatively coherent 
views on those doctrines of international law. Although differences 
exist, these tribunals are clearly engaged in the same dialectic. The 
fundamentals of this general international law remain the same re-
gardless of which tribunal decides the case.  
Id. at 699. 
 233. President of the ICJ Gilbert Guillaume, Statement to the U.N. General 
Assembly (Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ 
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It is important to stress that opponents of court proliferation 
have legitimate concerns.  There indeed have been incidents of 
conflicting interpretations of international law by different 
tribunals in the past.  The Nicaragua Case decided by the ICJ 
in 1986234 and the Tadic Case decided by the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY in 1997235 provide an example.  The issue before the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case was whether 
the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bos-
nian Serbs of Republika Srpska and the central authorities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina could be qualified as an international 
conflict after the Yugoslav National Army had withdrawn from 
the area.  A related question was whether the armed forces of 
the Bosnian Serbs were to be regarded as armed forces of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
If they were regarded as the latter, then the conflict was an in-
ternational one according to the Third Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949 (“3GC”).236 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the 3GC requirement 
concerning the “belonging [of armed forces] to a Party to the 
conflict”237 implicitly “refers to a test of control.”238  To examine 
the degree of control that defines whether armed forces belong 
to one or the other party, the Appeals Chamber referred to the 
concept of control defined by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.  In 
Nicaragua the ICJ concluded that the control exercised by a 
state over armed forces acting in another state, in this case the 
Contras of Nicaragua, had to be an “effective control of the mili-
tary or paramilitary operations in the course of which alleged 
  
SPEECHES/iSpeechPresident_Guillaume_GA55_2001026.htm, cited in Oel-
lers-Frahm, supra note 5, at 68; cf. ICJ Press Communique 99/46, Failure by 
Member States of the United Nations to Pay Their Dues Transgresses Princi-
ples of International Law, President Schwebel tells United Nations General 
Assembly (Oct. 26, 1999), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress 
1999/ipresscom9946_19991026.htm (statement of former President of the ICJ 
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel). 
 234. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 6. 
 235. See Tadic Case (Prosecutor v. Du [Ko Tadic]), 1999 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-
1-A (July 15), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgment/tad-
aj990715e.pdf [hereinafter Tadic Case]. 
 236. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 237. Id. art. 4(2). 
 238. Tadic Case, supra note 235, ¶ 95. 
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violations were committed.”239  However, in the Tadic Case, the 
Appeals Chamber refused to share the findings of the ICJ.  In-
stead, it went into an exhaustive discussion and a review of the 
ICJ findings, criticizing the ICJ decision as “not always follow-
ing a straight line of reasoning” and as “at first sight somewhat 
unclear.”240  By so doing, the Appeals Chamber “by far over-
stepped its judicial function.”241   As Oellers-Frahm pointed out: 
Although it is not only legitimate but even desirable that a 
court or tribunal in finding its decisions gives regard to deci-
sions of other courts and tribunals on comparable items, the 
scope of regard given to a decision of another court or tribunal 
cannot, however, result in a review of that decision but has to 
be restricted to examining how far that decision may serve as 
a guideline for the case in hand and whether the circum-
stances of the case allow its application.242 
There have been similar conflicting interpretations of inter-
national human rights law between the ECJ and E.Ct.H.R.243  It 
has even been asserted that many laymen and experts “are fre-
quently confused” between the mandates of the two European 
courts.  Thus,  
[I]ndividuals have been known to submit to the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities applications alleging viola-
tions of human rights, and national courts have even been 
known to request the European Court of Human Rights to give 
a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of European Com-
munity law.  Mistakes of this kind can have far graver conse-
quences for those concerned than the errors which are fre-
quently made in addressing the application, most of which 
give Brussels as their destination — an eminently European 
  
 239. Nicaragua Case, supra note 6, ¶ 115, at 65. 
 240. Tadic Case, supra note 235, ¶¶ 108, 114. 
 241. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 5, at 79 (maintaining that the function of 
the Appeals Chamber was to review the judgments of the Trial Chambers of 
the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. and not the judgments of the ICJ or any other court 
or tribunal). 
 242. Id. at 79–80. 
 243. See, e.g., Rick Lawson, Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpreta-
tions of the European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Lux-
embourg, in III THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS 219 (1994). 
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city, but one in which neither of the two “European” courts 
have their seat.244  
Therefore, confusion about the two courts still persists in 
Europe, notwithstanding its advanced communication and in-
formation technology, as well as other comparative advantages.  
This begs the question whether having two courts would not 
cause even greater confusion to ordinary Africans or even gov-
ernment officials.  
International law should develop uniformly in the Africa con-
tinent and throughout the international legal community.  For 
Africa, having two courts is likely to create more confusion than 
benefits.  The proposed two courts will probably be given both 
contentious and advisory jurisdictions to interpret various legal 
instruments including human rights treaties; thus, there is a 
real danger that the two bodies might give conflicting interpre-
tations to treaties invoked before them and thus create dispa-
rate legal norms.  The problem could be compounded by the fact 
that neither court is envisaged to be superior to the other and, 
thus, neither can overrule decisions of the other.  The resultant 
confusion would impede, rather than facilitate, the development 
of human rights jurisprudence in Africa.245 
C. Arguments Based on Funding 
Do African leaders have the political will and material 
wherewithal to operate two supra-national judicial institutions?  
Even if it is desirable to have two courts in the continent, can 
the continent afford them at the moment?  These practical con-
siderations must be taken into account in making the choice of 
having one court or two.  Before looking at the financial 
strength of the AU, it is necessary to identify the basic needs of 
the proposed two courts.  The following discussion concerns 
mainly with the proposed two judicial bodies, but it will also 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to many other organs expressly or 
impliedly created under the AU Act.  
  
 244. Kohler, supra note 222, at 17. 
 245. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the African 
Union: A Legal Analysis, 33 CAL. WEST. INT’L L.J. 69 (2002); Nsongurua J. 
Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and 
Human Rights, 17 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 1177 (2002). 
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To start with, each of the proposed courts will require a build-
ing to house the court rooms, the judges’ chambers, and the of-
fices for secretariats, including the Registrars.  These offices 
must be equipped with furniture and other necessary supplies.  
Furthermore, in an age of information and technological revolu-
tion, the judges and the staff will need Internet-ready com-
puters, telephones, fax machines, and other equipment.  The 
AU will also have to provide accommodation for the judges and 
their support staff, particularly the senior ones.  For judges who 
will serve on permanent basis, like the President of the African 
Human Rights Court,246 as well as the Registrars,247 permanent 
accommodations are envisaged.  Other judges will possibly have 
to be accommodated in (potentially more expensive) hotels 
whenever their services are called for. 
In addition to the Registry staff, different courts will also re-
quire legal secretaries, known as attaché, which have become 
indispensable to the modern adjudicatory systems.248  Two atta-
ché are currently serving the African Commission.  To support 
the function of two courts more attaché will be needed.  In this 
regard, the E.Ct.H.R. Legal Secretariat provides some guidance.  
In the Registry of the E.Ct.H.R., teams of lawyers are employed, 
whose functions are, inter alia, to administer the cases.  In par-
ticular, they undertake preliminary research on cases, and draft 
essential procedural documents, case correspondence, and court 
decisions to be considered by Judge Rapporteur.  Many of these 
lawyers have in-depth knowledge of the case law of both the 
European Commission and the E.Ct.H.R.  They work closely 
with the judge or judges to whom they are attached.  They also 
advise the practicing lawyers on case progress or even substan-
tive law and court procedures.249  The ECJ also has a similar 
pool of lawyers serving as legal secretariat.  The proposed Afri-
  
 246. See, e.g., Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 21(2) (“The presi-
dent shall perform judicial functions on a full-time basis and shall reside at 
the seat of the Court.”). 
 247. See id. art. 24(2) (“The office and residence of the Registrar shall be at 
the place where the Court has its seat.”). 
 248. The closest analogy to legal secretaries in the common law world is the 
law clerk of the American judicial system, where outstanding law graduates 
are usually invited to serve for a year or two as personal assistant to a senior 
judge. 
 249. See LEACH, supra note 218, at 20. 
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can courts will particularly need legal secretariats given that 
not all judges will have prior practical experience in interna-
tional adjudication. 
Another major resource the courts will require is a library 
and documentation center.  The library must be stocked with 
rich legal materials dealing with both African and comparative 
law.  It must also maintain a comprehensive collection of the 
laws of member states.  In addition, there should be facilities 
for users, such as legal research and photocopying services, and 
separate similar facilities for the judges of the Courts.  Fur-
thermore, like any modern library, the African court library 
must be equipped with computers with Internet access.  Compe-
tent librarians will need to be employed.  They will also have to 
be trained in each of the principal legal systems and the courts’ 
languages and regularly exposed to modern information sys-
tems.  They will further be expected to provide the judges, law-
yers, and the legal secretaries with background information on 
the legal problems presented before the courts. 
Next, given the multi-lingual character they promote, the 
Courts will need teams of qualified linguists to translate court 
documents.  Pleadings and other court processes will need to be 
translated into the working languages of the courts, which in-
clude English, French, Arabic, Portuguese and, maybe, African 
languages.  The court decisions will have to be translated both 
for inclusion in the annual reports to the Assembly of the AU 
(as required, for example, by the Protocol to the African Char-
ter250), as well as for publication.  The court will need interpret-
ers to provide simultaneous translations during oral proceed-
ings and at other court meetings and conferences.  Whether 
these translators and interpreters will serve as permanent staff 
of the courts or will be hired on an ad hoc basis, as is the case 
with the African Commission, there is no doubt that they will 
be required. 
The foregoing identifies just some, not all, of what the African 
Courts will require to function properly.  Sufficiently financing 
these needs will be a big problem.  Indeed, many supranational 
  
 250. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 31 (“The Court shall 
submit to each regular session of the Assembly, a report on its work during 
the previous year. The report shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a 
State has not complied with the Court’s judgement.”). 
File: UDOMBANABaseMacroFinal 6-7.doc Created on:  6/7/2003 5:52 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:25 PM 
862 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
institutions in Africa are suffering from chronic financial inca-
pacity and their leaders constantly receive less than adequate 
resources; like bread in a besieged town, every man gets a little, 
but no man gets a full meal.  The problem is compounded by the 
fact that African states have routinely defaulted in meeting 
their financial obligations to the continental body.  The AU, for 
example, has inherited an empty treasury from the OAU and its 
finances are predictably dry.  Many uncompleted projects em-
barked upon by the OAU dot the continent.  It is also unfortu-
nate to note that the AU has no befitting building as its head-
quarters because the OAU failed to erect one.  For thirty-nine 
years, the OAU operated from a former prison that Emperor 
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia donated to the body at its founding in 
1963.  The Secretariat of the AU is also located here.  It seems 
ironic that an organization that was set up to liberate Africa 
and its peoples from the bitter herbs of colonialism has itself 
been operating from a former prison!  How will the AU manage 
to provide the proposed two courts with resources when it itself 
does not have a suitable headquarters? 
For more than sixteen years after the inauguration of the Af-
rican Commission — the existing quasi-judicial institution for 
the implementation of the African Charter — it is yet to have a 
permanent building.  One is being constructed in a snail speed. 
Meanwhile, the Commission still operates in a rented apart-
ment in Bunjul, the Gambia.  In contrast, the E.Ct.H.R. — not 
to mention the European Council Secretariat — in Strasbourg 
has “a striking building designed by Sir Richard Rodgers.”251 
Like beggars, many existing OAU/AU institutions constantly 
carry their bowls to look for crumbs from the table of European 
institutions in the form of grants.  The Council of Ministers of 
the OAU, now Executive Council of the AU, has repeatedly ex-
pressed “serious concern about the increasing arrears of contri-
butions, thus undermining the capacity of the Secretariat to 
carry out approved programmes and activities.”252  The AU As-
sembly at its First Ordinary Session in July 2002 at Durban, 
  
 251. Ryssdall, supra note 111, at 20 (noting also that the new building be-
came necessary “because the former home of the Convention institutions was 
in danger of collapsing under the weight of files”). 
 252. Decision on the Report of the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Com-
mittee on Contributors, OAU Council of Ministers, 76th Ord. Sess., CM/Dec. 
652,¶ 2 (June 28–July 6, 2002). 
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South Africa authorized the Interim Commission of the AU “to 
continue with the process of transferring the assets and liabili-
ties of the OAU to the African Union.”253  The liabilities that the 
Interim Commission has assumed from the OAU include huge 
arrears of contributions totaling $54.53 million.  This debt is 
owed to the AU by forty-five out of its fifty-four member coun-
tries.254  This financial crisis of the AU does not bode well for the 
proposed two courts. 
Although the AU was formally inaugurated in July 2002, 
many of its organs are not yet functional, largely due to the lack 
of funds.  Only three organs appear to have been officially com-
missioned — the Assembly of the AU, the Executive Council, 
and the Commission.  The other organs, including the Pan-
African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Permanent Repre-
sentatives Council, the Specialized Technical Committees, the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the Financial Institu-
tions,255 and the proposed Peace and Security Council256 are yet 
to see the light of the day.  Even the Commission, which serves 
as the secretarial arm of the AU, is presently designated as “the 
Interim Commission,” while the Secretary-General has been 
designated as “the Interim Chairperson of the Commission and 
the Assistant Secretaries General shall be acting Commission-
ers.”257  This evidences that all is not well with the AU.  
Africa must act cautiously in light of the AU’s present reality.  
Establishing two courts seems overly ambitious given the seri-
ous financial challenges of the AU.258  
  
 253. Decision on the Interim Period, Assembly of the AU, First Ordinary 
Session, ASS/AU/Dec. 1(1), ¶ 2(ix) (July 2002). 
 254. For the list of defaulting countries, see Baffour Ankomah, African Un-
ion in Danger of Being Stillborn, NEW AFR. 16, 20 (2002). 
 255. See, AU ACT, supra note 23, art. 5 (listing of the main organs of the 
AU). 
 256. The Peace and Security Council was established pursuant to the Proto-
col Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, AU Assembly, 1st Ordinary Sess., July 9, 2002, available at 
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/secprot.htm.  This protocol 
establishes an operational structure “for the effective implementation of the 
decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace sup-
port operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction.”  Id. at pmbl., ¶ 17. 
 257. Decision on Interim Period, supra note 183, ¶ 2(iv)–(v). 
 258. Jeremiah’s question to the children of Israel several centuries ago is 
relevant to Africa’s current situation: “If you have run with the footmen, and 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is significant that five years after the adoption of the Hu-
man Rights Protocol to establish an African Human Rights 
Court only a handful of states — six as at September 2002 — 
have ratified it.  These states include Burkina Faso (December 
31, 1998), Mali (October 5, 2000), Senegal (September 29, 1998), 
Gambia (June 30, 1999), Uganda (February 16, 2001), and 
South Africa (July 3, 2002).259  A total of fifteen ratifications are 
needed for the Protocol to enter into force.260  It appears that 
with the adoption of the AU Act, which provides for the estab-
lishment of an AU Court of Justice, African leaders do not know 
what to make of the Human Rights Court.  They seem to have 
boxed themselves into a corner!  Wittingly or unwittingly, they 
also appear to have crushed Africans’ rising hope for the timely 
creation of a Human Rights Court to compliment the weak 
mandate of the African Commission and to effectively enforce 
the provisions of the African Charter and other relevant human 
rights instruments ratified by their governments. 
But there is a way out of the dilemma.  Actually, the road to 
the city and the road out of it are usually the same road; it de-
pends on which direction one travels.  As this Article has indi-
cated, though multiplication of judicial institutions may in 
many other cases facilitate the development of international 
law, having more than one court in a collective Africa is not a 
sensible decision.  Establishing two courts under the current 
climate of uncertainty would have regrettable consequences, 
like sending a man to the sea without preparing him for tem-
pests.  A realistic approach is for the AU to establish and 
strengthen one judicial institution, which may be, but not nec-
essarily, the African Human Rights Court, before ever embark-
ing on another.  The jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court 
could be enlarged to cover the interpretation and application of 
the AU Act and allied instruments.  There is an alternative ap-
proach, which this Article favors.  It is this: The AU should 
establish the AU Court, not as an arm of the AU but as an 
  
they have wearied you, [t]hen how can you contend with horses? And if in the 
land of peace, [i]n which you trusted, they have wearied you, [t]hen how will 
you do in the flooding of the Jordan?”  Jeremiah 12:5 (New King James). 
 259. See AU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.5 (2002). 
 260. See Human Rights Protocol, supra note 19, art. 34(3). 
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autonomous institution capable of addressing the myriad of 
problems confronting the continent.  The AU Court could have 
different chambers to deal with different major problems afflict-
ing the continent.  Thus, one chamber could be seized with mat-
ters of international economic law including economic integra-
tion, another with human rights issues, and still others with 
environment or international criminal law including terrorism, 
etc.  Such divisions of labor would be justifiable because they 
would create specialization and efficiency. 
The chamber system is not really new; it is practiced in the 
ICJ. The ICJ Statute provides that the Court may, from time to 
time, form one or more chambers composed of three or more 
judges as the Court may determine. Such chambers are author-
ized to deal with particular classes of cases; for example, laces 
and cases relating to transit and communications.261 The Court 
also may, at any time, form a chamber to deal with a particular 
case, in which case the number of judges to constitute such a 
chamber will be determined by the Court with the approval of 
the parties.262 The ICJ has, in practice, established special 
chambers to deal with particular cases. In July 1993, for exam-
ple, the Court created a special Chamber to deal with environ-
mental questions,263 a subject that has become as topical as hu-
man rights.  
Happily, the Draft Protocol is designed along the above sug-
gestions. Taking inspiration from Article 26(1) of the ICJ Stat-
ute, the Draft Protocol creates “Special Chambers.”  It provides 
that “[t]he Court may from time to time form one or more cham-
bers, composed of three or more Judges as the Court may 
determine, for dealing with particular categories of cases; for 
example violation of the Constitutive Act; human rights; dis-
putes on budgetary matters; and commercial matters.”264  More 
significantly, it provides that the African Human Rights Court 
shall be constituted as a Chamber of the AU Court, upon entry 
into force of the Protocol to the African Charter or the adoption 
of the Draft Protocol, “whichever may be sooner.”265 
  
 261. See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 26(1). 
 262. Id. art. 26(2)&(3). 
 263. See SHAW, supra note 207, at  585. 
 264. Draft Protocol, supra note 113, art. 60(1). 
 265. Id. art. 60(2). 
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The Draft Protocol also allows for other category of chambers 
to be created annually “[w]ith a view to the speedy dispatch of 
business.”266  Such chambers, which shall be composed of five 
Judges, may, at the request of the parties, “hear and determine 
cases by summary procedure.”267  A judgment given by any of 
these chambers, including those to deal with particular category 
of cases, “shall be considered as rendered by the Court.”268 T. O. 
Elias questions a similar provision in Article 27 of the ICJ Stat-
ute.269  According to this former President of the ICJ, Article 27: 
[H]as far-reaching implications for the jurisprudence of the 
Court, particularly when it is observed that there is no re-
quirement of consultation between the court and the fraction 
of it constituting the chamber in question. There is no provi-
sion for the Court itself to have seen even the draft judgment 
of any chamber before it is rendered to the Court, nor is there 
any provision for the Court itself (that is, such other Members 
of it other than those of the chamber concerned) to have seen 
the draft or express an opinion.270 
Elias believes that it is “highly desirable that the chamber 
should operate as no more than a committee of the whole of the 
Court, and mainly answerable to it for its judgment.”271 
Notwithstanding these reservations, it may be said that the 
chamber system is a welcome development in a collective Af-
rica, in view of the arguments earlier advanced in this Article. 
Indeed, if States Parties to the AU Act agree on these provi-
sions, then the goal of this Article would have been achieved. 
Besides, any fear that a single African court will not be able to 
interpret and apply all the existing and future legal instru-
ments executed by the OAU/AU is unfounded.  Compared to the 
relatively few multilateral treaties so far enacted by the 
OAU/AU,272 some 260 bilateral or multilateral treaties provide 
  
 266. Id. art. 61. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. art. 62.  
 269. ELIAS, UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE WORLD COURT, supra note 
180, at 204. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. The legally binding instruments adopted under the auspices of the 
OAU/AU include the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa 
and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous 
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for the ICJ to have jurisdiction in the resolution of disputes 
arising out of their application or interpretation.273  In addition, 
states regularly submit special disputes to the ICJ by way of 
special agreements.274  The dispute caseload of the ICJ has also 
increased over the years.  In the 1970s, the ICJ had only one or 
two cases on its docket at any one time; this number varied be-
tween 9 and 10 from 1990 to 1997.  As of July 31, 2001, the 
number rose to 22.275  The subject matters of these cases are also 
varied. The Court continues to decide classical disputes such as 
those between neighboring states seeking a determination of 
their land and maritime boundaries.  Currently the ICJ is hear-
ing such territorial dispute cases between Indonesia and Ma-
laysia, and Nicaragua and Honduras.  Other cases involve com-
plaints of human rights violation made by states whose nation-
als suffered injuries in other states.  Currently such cases in-
volve Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liech-
tenstein and Germany.276 
The ICJ has creatively managed this increasing responsibility 
by, inter alia, taking steps to simplify proceedings, “in particu-
  
Wastes within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773, reprinted in 1 AFR. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 268 (1993) (entered into force Apr. 22, 1998); and the AEC Treaty, 
supra note 25.  Others are: the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, July, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, reprinted in 18 
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1112 (1999); OAU Convention Governing the Spe-
cific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 
(entered into force June 20, 1974); African Convention on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources, 1968, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.1, available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/african.conv.conserva.1969.html (entered 
into force June 16, 1969); the African Charter, supra note 20; Human Rights 
Protocol, supra note 19, and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, AHG/Dec.132 (XXXV), available at http://www.fidh. 
org/intgouv/ua/rapport/1999/antiterroconvention (not yet in force). 
 273. See 2000–2001 I.C.J. ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 1. 
 274. Id.  The ICJ may exercise jurisdiction over a dispute where the parties 
give consent ad hoc by special agreement (compromis). The special agreement, 
however, need not take a particular form; in fact, the ICJ has held that such 
consent ad hoc may arise where the plaintiff state has accepted the jurisdic-
tion by a unilateral application followed by a separate act of consent by the 
other party, either by a communication to the Court or by taking part in the 
institution of proceedings.  See Corfu Channel case (Prelim. Objections), 1948 
I.C.J. 27–28 (Apr. 9); BROWNLIE, supra note 54, at 716–17. 
 275. 2000–2001 I.C.J. ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 2. 
 276. For these and other examples, see id. 
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lar as regards preliminary objections and counter-claims.”277  In 
1997, the ICJ took various measures “to rationalize the work of 
the Registry, to make greater use of information technology, to 
improve its own working methods and to secure greater collabo-
ration from the parties in relation to its procedures.”278  The 
ICJ’s approach has shown that it is not the number of courts at 
the international level that matters but the quality of the 
court’s output.  Size never determines usefulness.  The ICJ is 
small measured by numbers279 but big in its commitment.  The 
ICJ’s achievement is also made possible by the moral and finan-
cial support of its parent body, the UN. Similarly, the AU must 
be prepared to give such support to its own institutions, includ-
ing the proposed court(s). 
The moral from all of the above is that the human entity is 
endowed with the intelligence and vision to regulate its conduct 
and constantly recreate its existence.  It is worthwhile to stress 
once again that in November 1998 the Council of Europe jetti-
soned the former two-tier institutional structure for the en-
forcement of the ECHR in favor of a single court.  The E.Ct.H.R 
presently has four sections, and each section is broken into 
chambers.280  There is also a Grand Chamber, which determines 
the merit of cases relinquished to its jurisdiction by the other 
chambers under article 30 of the ECHR or where it accepts a 
request for a referral — in effect, a re-hearing — of a case fol-
lowing a judgment by a chamber.  The beauty of the European 
arrangement is that it “allows for a more fluid exercise of the 
adjudicatory powers of the European Court.”281 
From a pragmatic perspective, it is better to have one African 
court that is normatively and structurally strong than having 
two weak institutions that exist only on paper.  The AU should 
recognize that two African courts are simply not feasible.  It 
  
 277. 2000–2001 I.C.J. ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 6. 
 278. Id. at 5–6 (citing its earlier report to the General Assembly, in response 
to GA Res. 52/161 of Dec. 15, 1997).  See Report of the ICJ, supra note _, Ap-
pendix I (during the period Aug. 1 to July 31 1998, the ICJ gave an account of 
these various measures). 
 279. The ICJ consists of 15 judges elected for a term of nine years by the UN 
General Assembly and the Security Council. One third of the Court is, how-
ever, renewed every three years.  I.C.J. Statute, supra note 54, art. 13(1). 
 280. See Protocol 11, supra note 90, art. 1. 
 281. Fix-Zamudio, supra note 173, at 513. 
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should either urge its member states to ratify the Human 
Rights Protocol to the African Charter in order to bring the 
Human Rights Court on board or immediately adopt the Proto-
col on the AU Court and set the process of ratification in mo-
tion.  It makes inordinately good sense that one court should 
give way for the other because a divided house cannot stand.  In 
fact, there are already many sub-regional courts that could 
compliment and supplement the work of a single African judi-
cial institution.  
If the AU rejects the Protocol to the African Charter and opts 
for one court — the AU Court — then it must incorporate some 
critical provisions of the Human Rights Protocol into the new 
Protocol.  The relevant provisions will include Articles 3 and 4 
on jurisdiction, Article 5 on access to the Court (locus standi), 
excluding the unnecessary and irritating optional clause of Ar-
ticle 34(6),282 and Article 10 on hearing and representation, 
particularly on legal aid.  Article 17 on the independence of the 
Court and Article 18 on incompatibility must also be incorpo-
rated.  In addition, Article 27 on findings and remedies, Article 
28 on judgment and Article 30 on execution of judgments must 
also be included.  It will also be necessary to define the relation-
ship between the African Commission and the AU Court.  The 
Commission could be effectively utilized as a filter mechanism 
for the Court, with respect to human rights matters.  It could, 
for example, handle issues of admissibility, including provi-
sional measures, while the AU Court addresses the merits. 
Overall, there will be a need to balance efficiency considerations 
with the due process requirements.  Furthermore, African civil 
societies must be vigilant with the exercise of judicial power to 
assure compliance of human rights. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Africa, undoubtedly, is in dire need of a court to develop in-
ternational law, strengthen the rule of law and deal with inter-
  
 282. The Draft Protocol, unfortunately, retains this provision, providing 
that the Court, in exercising its functions, “shall have jurisdiction to hear 
applications from individuals and non-governmental organizations of Member 
States in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 5 and paragraph 6 of Article 
34 of the Protocol on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”  Draft Protocol, supra note 
113, art. 60(3). 
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national legal crisis in the continent.  This Article, however, 
argues for one continental judicial institution to fulfill these 
goals and has adduced some reasons for this position.  Even 
assuming (which this Article constantly denies) that prolifera-
tion of judicial institutions is a good thing for a collective Africa, 
it is submitted that the timing is not ripe.  Africa must learn to 
walk before it runs.  Establishing many courts will obviously be 
great fun; but it should be remembered that there is a bill to 
pay for it.  Indeed, unless the AU streamlines its current over-
bloated operational structures, its current efforts at economic 
and political integration will be a waste of time.  The present 
experiment is like trying to reconstruct a forest out of broken 
branches and withered leaves.  That is not the path to sustain-
able development, the major goal of the AU enterprise. 
The Article has shown the direction that the AU should move 
towards actualizing its objectives in the AU Act, in particular 
with regards to the establishment of a judicial institution to 
administer Africa’s legal system.  The ultimate decision 
whether to establish one court or two or multiple courts, of 
course, rests with the AU Assembly; and it is hoped that, when 
push comes to shove, the Assembly will make the right choice.  
However, whichever court the AU chooses to establish, it must 
act fast to end the anguished anticipation of Africans and the 
international community. Africans cannot afford the climate of 
uncertainty regarding what and which judicial institution 
should and will be created to serve their needs.  “Hope differed 
makes the heart sick, but a longing fulfilled is a tree of life.”283 
 
  
 283. Proverbs 13:12 (NIV). 
